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Impact Assessment of OTI/Indonesia FY1999 Program

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Trip Report

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Date: April 10, 2000

Subject: Trip Report for Indonesia FY1999 Impact Assessment

Background: USAID/OTI/Washington asked PwC to conduct an impact assessment of OTI/Indonesia's programs in FY1999. Preparation for the TDY included finding and reading background materials; identifying program areas for inclusion in the impact assessment; and drafting an interview and travel schedule. The TDY itself included interviewing OTI staff at field offices in Jakarta and Surabaya; interviewing major grantees in both cities; holding roundtable conversations with grantees and/or sub-grantees; and conducting focus group discussions with direct program beneficiaries. In addition, the task involved reviewing a database and project records for demonstrated evidence of program impact. The assessment was conducted from March 14, 2000 through March 24, 2000.

Purpose: The purpose of the impact assessment was to use quantitative, qualitative, and anecdotal methods to identify impacts of FY1999 programs, with particular focus on the programs' impact towards peace and democracy. Specific objectives included:

- ✍ Identify key field programs for review during the assessment
- ✍ Collect qualitative and/or quantitative data on the key field programs, via informant interviews, focus groups, and reviewing secondary source materials
- ✍ Review data on the impacts and results of key field programs
- ✍ Briefly analyze the entire emergency transition program

Documentation / Deliverables:

- ✍ Report, "Impact Assessment of OTI/Indonesia FY1999 Program", final copy submitted to Jim Lehman (USAID/BHR/OTI) on April 10, 2000.

Accomplishments: Interviews and were conducted with 10 members of OTI and DAI staff in Jakarta and Surabaya. Informant interviews were conducted with 25 individuals representing 12 grantees and sub-grantees. One focus group discussion was held with media beneficiaries in Jakarta; two focus group discussions were held with media and elections beneficiaries in Surabaya. The distinction between a grantee interview and a beneficiary focus group was not clear since many of the “beneficiaries” invited were actually sub-grantees.

I held most of the discussions in Indonesian, but a few grantee discussions were attended by a mixed group of foreigners and Indonesian and the conversations defaulted to English. All Indonesian-language conversations were recorded and then reviewed for content; comments directly related to the purposes of the assessment were translated and transcribed into English. The OTI/Indonesia staff in Jakarta and Surabaya mentioned that the TDY was less of an intrusion on their time because they did not have to send a staff member with me to act as a translator.

OTI and DAI staff were gracious hosts and willingly shared information about their programs.

Lessons Learned:

- ✍ *Ensure that there is an opportunity for the researcher to meet with program staff in Washington.* The short notice and timing of the TDY meant that I was not able to meet with Washington OTI staff prior to departure to gain familiarity with the OTI/Indonesia programs. Field conversations in the field with DAI, Internews, and The Asia Foundation discussed the strategies which were used in making programming decisions and that were evident in implementation approaches; not having background knowledge of their programs made these interviews less efficient.
- ✍ *The impact assessment should be conducted within two months of the end of the fiscal year being studied.* Grantees and OTI/Indonesia staff members found it difficult to remember details about activities that, in some cases, had been implemented 16-18 months earlier. Also, some grantee organizations no longer existed, the primary grantee contact had moved to another organization, or the OTI/Indonesia staff member no longer worked in Indonesia; conducting an impact assessment closer to the period of activity would reduce the risk of institutional knowledge being lost. Furthermore, even in the best of offices, program reports and supporting documents have a tendency to disappear or be more difficult to recreate as time goes on.
- ✍ *Conduct the research in the languages grantees prefer and tape record sessions.* Grantees are more likely to feel comfortable providing feedback about their OTI-sponsored work if they have the opportunity to use their native language (or whichever language is appropriate, such as a national language).
- ✍ *Identify priority research questions that can logically be combined with the impact assessment.* When I returned from the field, two research questions emerged which were not part of the scope of the TDY but could have been: (1) what are the strengths and weaknesses of the PTG database as it is used in Indonesia and (2) what kind of feedback are grantees giving about program implementation? Given that OTI is currently reviewing the SWIFT contract mechanism, it might have been beneficial to combine the impact assessment with an assessment of the grantee experience with the grant mechanism. Since many comments did arise concerning implementation, I included that feedback as a bonus Annex to the report.

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1. Introduction

OTI's Mandate¹

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) established the Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/BHR/OTI) in 1994 to support peaceful democratic change in countries of strategic importance and humanitarian concern to the United States. As part of the Bureau of Humanitarian Response, OTI is designed to provide rapid, flexible assistance to countries poised for, or undergoing, political transition. OTI serves as a rapid deployment agent addressing urgent transitional needs that cannot be immediately funded by other USAID mechanisms.

Because of its mandate, OTI follows unconventional approaches, including:

- ✍ Streamlined funding mechanisms which allow OTI to approve urgent activities in a matter of days
- ✍ Direct collaboration with local partner organizations to maximize OTI's impact and ability to respond to changing needs
- ✍ Willingness to take calculated risks on activities with potential for exceptional returns
- ✍ Emphasis on innovation, such as encouraging partners to consider new and unorthodox activities
- ✍ Focus on near-term, high-impact interventions that can make the greatest near-term contributions to a political transition
- ✍ Timing interventions to harness the momentum of public demand for change
- ✍ Prioritizing activities that attack the roots, not the symptoms of transition problems

In FY1999, OTI had short-term programs in approximately one dozen countries, including Indonesia.

OTI in Indonesia

OTI's assistance to Indonesia was triggered by a series of events: the devastating economic crisis that began in late 1997; the riots, violence and political demonstrations that climaxed in May 1998; the sudden transition of political leadership when President Soeharto stepped down and transferred the presidency to Habibie in May 1998; and the scheduled general elections to be held in June 1999.

OTI's assistance to a handful of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Indonesia began at the end of FY1998. By FY1999, program activities had grown to 285 grants and could be categorized into five program areas, three of which were included in the scope of this impact assessment:

Program Category	Relationship to this report	Number of Grants ²
1. Civil Society Groups	Evaluated	105
2. Elections	Evaluated	83
3. Media	Evaluated	71
4. Governance	Not Evaluated	17
5. Civilian/Military Relations	Not Evaluated	9
<i>Total</i>		285

¹ Source: Materials in OTI/Indonesia Promotional Folder.

² Source: "Indonesia and East Timor Program: Overview of OTI in Indonesia"

✍ Expected impacts

According to the FY1999 Country Profile, OTI/Indonesia used six criteria to evaluate its success during FY1999. Not all of the criteria were evaluated in this assessment due to resource limitations.

Expected impact	Relationship to this report	Actual impact
1. Broader sections of public (particularly women) are represented in politics at both the local and national level through direct citizen involvement (i. e. town hall meetings) and the activities of NGOs.	Evaluated, in Election Programs	Greater citizen involvement, increased awareness of election issues, and increased interest in politics.
2. OTI-supported NGOs, media, and civil society organizations are able to articulate their messages to their constituents, the public, and to policy-makers.	Evaluated, in Election, Media, and Civil Society Programs	Civic education messages circulated and understood by public.
3. Journalists increase their professionalism and objectivity.	Evaluated, in Media Programs	Professional skills developed and valuable networks developed.
4. Regional Parliaments gain capacity to manage local area resources under Indonesia's new system of decentralization and undertake training and other initiatives on their own.	Not evaluated	--
5. The Military decreases its involvement in civil and political affairs, and take on a national security role.	Not evaluated	--
6. Inroads are made in the dialogue among conflicting parties in restive regions and conflict areas.	Not evaluated	--

Methodology and Approach

✍ Purpose of Research

This report summarizes the findings of an impact assessment of USAID/OTI's country transition programs in Indonesia for FY1999.

During a recent review of OTI's worldwide impact, results, and lessons learned (through the Results Review and Resource Request or "R4" document), OTI made a commitment to USAID to conduct "impact assessments" in its priority countries to better demonstrate effectiveness and methodology.

This research was conducted in March 2000 with the overall goal of *assessing the impact of OTI transition programs in Indonesia during FY1999*. Specific objectives included:

1. To identify key field programs for review during the assessment. “Key” means those programs that the field staff believe are already achieving significant results, that are considered priority areas for achieving results, and/or that have received the attention of important U.S. Government staff or local officials. The term “program” can mean strategic areas within an OTI Country Strategy (e.g., alternative media; civil-military relations) or it can mean activities (e.g., funding of a specific radio station in a rural area).
2. To collect qualitative and/or quantitative data on those principal field programs/activities through key informant interviews, focus groups, and secondary source material (both collected in the field and elsewhere).
3. To provide a qualitative and quantitative review of data on the impact/results of key field programs.
4. To assess whether and how OTI contributions have assisted the transition to peace and democracy, and to provide a brief analysis of the entire emergency transition program, with a focus on incorporating major findings from the impact assessment.

✍ Methodology

In discussion with OTI/Indonesia staff, three program areas were identified as having the greatest overall impact on peace and democracy in Indonesia in FY1999 and were therefore selected for further analysis in this assessment: Media campaign, Elections, and Emerging civil society groups. Interviews, focus group discussions and site visits were held in Jakarta and Surabaya. While OTI also had significant activity in Medan during FY1999, the site was not visited due to time and resource constraints.

✍ **In-depth Interviews.** The researcher conducted in-depth interviews of OTI/Indonesia program staff, principal grantees (Internews, PACT, Asia Foundation and LP3ES), and Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) who implemented a large portion of the grants in FY1999. The interviews identified “key” OTI grants in Indonesia; discussed intended and actual goals and impacts of grants; and discussed strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of OTI/Indonesia grants. The term “impact” was used to reflect changes that occurred as a result of OTI activities, which can be substantiated by the collection of data (qualitative or quantitative). The interview guide and list of interviewees is included in the Annex B and C. Interviews ranged from one-on-one to a group of five.

✍ **Focus Groups.** The distinction between interviews with grantees and focus group discussions with beneficiaries was somewhat blurred as many of the beneficiaries were actually sub-grantees. Four focus group discussions were held with beneficiaries of OTI/Indonesia programs: two in Surabaya for Elections, one in Jakarta for Elections and one in Jakarta for Civil Society. OTI staff in Jakarta and Surabaya identified the participants of the focus group discussions and arranged all logistics for the meetings. We do not know what kind of bias may have been present (OTI’s bias in who to select, or bias in which beneficiaries were willing to participate) in the selection.

✍ **Review of Database/secondary source material:** The OTI grantee database was reviewed as well as other material provided by OTI/Indonesia and its grantees.

Interviews and focus group discussions were conducted whichever language the group being interviewed preferred (English or Indonesian). All focus group discussions were held in Indonesian and about half of the interviews were in Indonesian. All Indonesian-language conversations were recorded and later

reviewed for content. Comments of particular value to this assessment were translated and transcribed in the Annexes D, E and F.

✍ Limitations of Research

Due to the limited time provided for this assessment, it does not examine the impact of all OTI/Indonesia activities in FY1999. The approach was primarily qualitative as resources did not allow for quantitative analysis of the entire portfolio. This assessment relies heavily on the existing paper trail of OTI/Indonesia success stories in Indonesia and the anecdotal evidence that OTI/Indonesia staff provided in assessing the country program's overall contributions towards peace and democracy. Furthermore, only a small number of selected beneficiaries was available to provide qualitative evidence in order to assess the impact of specific programs. Although this study does find evidence of positive and meaningful impacts in the OTI/Indonesia FY1999 program, *this study cannot assess what proportion* of the FY1999 portfolio had meaningful impacts.

✍ Structure of Report

Chapter Two examines the impact of three program areas and Chapter Three examines the country program as a whole. Annexes provide supplementary information, such as an interview guide (Annex B), list of interviewees Annex C), transcripts of grantees' and beneficiaries' comments about program impact (Annex D), and program implementation (Annexes E and F).

2. Impact of Programs

Election Programs

The OTI election programs began in early FY1999 in preparation for Indonesia's general elections in June 1999. OTI/Indonesia supported large-scale civic education efforts, through public service announcements on national television, political party debates in the local media, training for journalists on how to cover an election, and grassroots voter education activities. The election programs were visible and successful. Common themes were conducting peaceful elections, how to participate in elections, and democratic change. Three specific kinds of activities were identified for further analysis:

1. Journalist training for the elections
2. Voter education via workshops and training sessions
3. Voter education via public service announcements

✍ Journalist Training for the Elections

Example of Journalist Training for the Elections

With full funding from OTI/Indonesia, **Indonesia Media Watch (IMW)** conducted a four-day training workshop in Surabaya in FY1999 for journalists from various media organizations (print, radio and television) to learn about investigative reporting techniques for covering election results and violations in the post-election period. Presenters consisted of national level political experts, prominent journalism professors, newspaper owners, and public opinion leaders. There was a field component in which the participants returned to their various media organizations, researched particular issues, and submitted examples of their articles or broadcasts for a competition.³ This activity received an overall impact score of 4.03 (out of 5.0) on the OTI/Indonesia Impact Assessment Scale.⁴

Focus group discussions with beneficiaries of the training program⁵, interviews with the grantee, and OTI/Indonesia records all demonstrated that the workshop had positive impacts:

- ✍ *Increased awareness of changes in election rules.* “For myself, I learned about the rules and regulations about the election mechanics. Then I also learned about the kinds of cheating that were ghosts from all the past elections that might disturb us now.... But it's not just for me, I can also give this knowledge [to the readers of my newspaper]” (Source: Focus group discussion with beneficiaries).
- ✍ *Created opportunity for networking.* “The workshop provided the rare opportunity for journalists and opinion-makers from throughout East Java to meet and compare ideas on political issues” (Source: OTI/Indonesia/Surabaya “Success Story” documents). “Also we made a network of colleagues.... Because we have met so many times at these training programs, we have talked on our own and made

³ Source: OTI/Indonesia/Surabaya's “Success Stories”.

⁴ See Other Contributions on page 19.

⁵ An additional training program on investigative reporting was funded directly by the U. S. Embassy, and a training program on polling techniques was held at the beginning of FY2000. Although beneficiaries and program organizers from IMW did focus their comments on the FY1999 program, it is clear that it is difficult to segregate the individual impacts of the particular programs.

our own network. It wasn't a direct [intended] impact of the program" (Source: Focus group discussion with beneficiaries).

- ✍ *Encouraged peaceful relationships.* "Our friends who came to the training told stories about [the problems] in each of their provinces, and so we really found out what was going on there.... I know it's not ideal, but [we made some progress towards] the process of peace..." (Source: Focus group discussion with beneficiaries).
- ✍ *Provided opportunity to learn about cases of election fraud.* "[The OTI-sponsored training on investigative reporting] had three themes. About the election, yes, automatically the training familiarized us with the new political rules and the whole election system of proportional voting and the districts; that was according to the theory and the new laws. Second, we got information from some important figures in the community...who were very vocal about discussing some of the cheating that happened in their areas, such as someone...who told stories about election monitoring in the old times. Third, we had the chance to make friend and informal professional networks...so that we would monitor the elections together" (Source: Focus group discussion with beneficiaries).
- ✍ *Provided skills on how to report on election fraud.* "The important thing was that the training showed us how to uncover *kecurangan* (abuses and cheating) about the election" (Source: Focus group discussion with beneficiaries).
- ✍ *Spread the activity to other regions.* Although the training was intended for journalists from East Java and all the provinces to the east of Java, journalists from Central Java also attended the training as observers and expressed interest in holding a similar training in their region. The interested journalists opened branches of IMW in Yogyakarta and in West Java and secured funding from OTI/Indonesia for similar training workshops⁶ (Source: OTI/Indonesia/Surabaya "Success Story" documents).
- ✍ *Improved understanding of democracy.* "The journalists can write better, and they have a better idea of what democracy is and how to investigate the government" (Source: Discussion with IMW Members).
- ✍ *Improved professional attitude of journalists.* "I think the journalists [who attended the OTI-sponsored training] have a more professional attitude now.... Now they can give better information to the people, the readers. And they can give the important information to the readers, like about the issue of regional autonomy, and so forth." "I think our training programs had a positive psychological effect on the participants.... I think the participants had pride that they had been trained according to U. S. standards for journalism" (Source: Discussion with IMW Members).

⁶ See additional grants DAIS0002 and DAIS0003; the new organizations of IMW-Yogya and IMW-West Java were founded.

Example of Voter Education Workshops:

PUSKOWANJATI. The Pusat Koperasi Wanita dari Jawa Timur (“Women’s Cooperative Center of East Java”, or PUSKOWANJATI) has a long history as an association whose primary activity has been managing savings and loan mechanisms for its members. Its membership of 42 “primary” cooperatives covers a total membership of 30,000 individuals (mostly women). PUSKOWANJATI has been able to sustain its economic/lending activities while providing low interest capital for women to start and/or improve small businesses. The group is also aware of the historic manipulation of their member cooperatives at the hands of political elements.

With funding from OTI/Indonesia in FY1999, PUSKOWANJATI was able to hold a two-day political education seminar and workshop/dialogue. The results of the seminar formed the basis of a dialogue between political parties, panelists and co-op activists that was broadcasted on a prominent radio station. The two-day event sought to 1) increase awareness of political rights and responsibilities in a democratic political system for both PUSKOWANJATI members and the general public that listened to the radio broadcast; and 2) increase awareness of women’s issues among the political parties who participated in the dialogue.

KPP. The Komite Pemberdayaan Pemilih (“Joint Committee for Voter Education”, KPP) was established by a well-known scholar and reformer as an *ad hoc* group to inform voters. With OTI support in FY1999, the KPP circulated a weekly tabloid on electoral issues, held public polls in three cities, held two public debates, and published public service announcements (PSAs) in local and national newspapers.

YASPPUK. The Yayasan Pendamping Perempuan Usaha Kecil (“Foundation for Women in Small Business”, YASPPUK) has a network of 91⁷ non-governmental (NGO) members across the country representing approximately 10,000 women leaders in small business. YASPPUK realized the potential their network held for engaging small business owners in political issues and observed the need to encourage its constituents to voice their needs and concerns regarding policy decisions.

YASPPUK received funding assistance from OTI and workplan design assistance from the International Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES) and the International Republican Institute (IRI). The major activity was holding over 30 symposia with 22 local NGOs across the country at the regional, provincial, and district levels, attracting a combined audience of approximately 1,400 direct participants. The symposia explored general issues, such as women’s role in politics and the importance of voting.

Meetings with members of PUSKOWANJATI, YASPPUK, and KPP; discussions with beneficiaries of the training programs; and a review of OTI/Indonesia documents concluded that voter education efforts had the following positive impacts:

✍ *Increased understanding of voting.* “Now I understand what elections mean.... They must be free, fair, and secret. So that we have our own choice in the election” (Source: YASPPUK Beneficiary, as quoted in “Success Story”).

⁷ According to Ms. Titik, YASPPUK.

- ✍ *Increased motivation to vote.* “I heard the campaign and I liked it.... For me, it really motivates me to participate in the general election” (Source: YASPPUK Beneficiary, as quoted in “Success Story”). “The impact on behavior we can see a little bit in the numbers of people who volunteered to be observers/witnesses for election day” (Organizer).

- ✍ *Increased awareness of politics.* “Maybe other women are different from me...because they are already smart about politics. But for me, I was blind and I didn’t know anything about politics at all. So this kind of education seminar opened my mind to politics and made me more mature about politics... (Source: PUSKOWANJATI Beneficiary).

- ✍ *Increased vocabulary and willingness to discuss politics.* “It’s very interesting to hear [the beneficiaries] use their own language to talk about politics.” “I also saw a kind of confidence emerge in the women who attended [the political education program] because of the sheer numbers of women gathered. Individually, most of the women did not have the guts to speak out. But after gathering in a group of 200-300, they said intelligent things of high quality in loud voices” (Source: PUSKOWANJATI Organizers). “Since we had this political education program...now when there are meetings, we can include a little bit of political education on the side” (Source: PUSKOWANJATI Beneficiary).

- ✍ *Changed perceptions about gender roles.* “Ever since I was a child my grandmother told me that a woman must work in the kitchen, serve her husband, take care of her children, and doesn’t need high levels of education. But now I understand that’s not true” (Source: YASPPUK Beneficiary, as quoted in “Success Story”). “...So many women think that politics is dirty.... There was a kind of *mudeng* (new realization). [With the OTI-sponsored workshop] we could realize that actually it’s not just men who can be representatives of political parties but women can be representatives too” (Source: PUSKOWANJATI Beneficiary).

- ✍ *Interest in receiving more political education.* “Yes, there are some women who don’t want to receive this kind of political education, but there are more that want it now than those who don’t.... Their minds have been opened. Maybe they can be opened further” (Source: PUSKOWANJATI Beneficiary).

- ✍ *Changed attitudes among politicians.* “The seminar had the impact of making the men [the representatives of the political parties who attended the workshop] a little more open minded. So that they will give women an opportunity in the election.” “...We found out which parties *peduli* (cared about or paid attention to) women” (Source: PUSKOWANJATI Organizers).

- ✍ *Less compliance with status quo leadership of co-ops.* “[The beneficiaries’]...comments are not just about politics but sometimes also about the administration of their local cooperative group/association too.... Now members sometimes quote the bylaws of the organization or otherwise ask questions if there is a problem. So the life of the cooperatives themselves have been affected. There have also been a couple of groups of women who have met on their own to talk more in depth about politics. This all happened after the [political education] program [that OTI/Indonesia sponsored]” (Source: PUSKOWANJATI Organizer).

- ✍ *Curiosity about other topics.* “An impact from the voter education was clear in the field...there were some changes in the mindset of the [beneficiaries].... They are asking questions, not just about the election, but also about wider subjects” (KPP Organizer). “Like someone who said, “oh our country is in debt, and it is a large debt” because before they didn’t know that there were loans financing development.... They say those things in their own language” (YASPPUK Organizer).

Example of Voter Education via Public Service Announcements

The **Visi Anak Bangsa** (“Vision of the Nation”, VAB) was created to inform voters about electoral issues and to encourage their participation in Indonesia’s broader transition to democratic rule. The hallmark of VAB’s activities was a series of public service announcements (PSAs, or *Iklan Layanan Masyarakat*) which aired on the five national independent television networks and reached nearly 140 million Indonesians (of a total population of ~210 million). VAB also included radio PSAs, public dialogues in the form of “town hall” meetings⁸; the Polling Center provided thorough concept testing for each PSA, and public opinion polling before and after PSAs aired. VAB’s activities began at the end of FY1998 with OTI assistance but mostly occurred during FY1999.

Impacts of the VAB campaign, which received most of its funding from OTI, included:

- ✍ *High rates of viewing and understanding PSAs.* As many as 80% of viewers recalled and correctly understood the campaign’s messages.⁹ Some PSAs had recognition rates of over 90%.¹⁰
- ✍ *High popularity.* Many forms of voter education materials were available before the election. Two surveys conducted independently of VAB confirmed that various VAB PSAs were the most popular forms of voter education. A survey produced by Charney Research and ACNielsen in December 1999 found that VAB’s “Make up your own mind” PSA was the most popular of all the forms of voter education (Source: “Indonesia National Voter Education Follow-up Survey Report”, page 57). Similarly, a survey conducted by Universitas Indonesia and Ohio State University found that the “Inga-Inga” PSA was the most popular form of voter education (source: “Hasil Survei Nasional Perilaku Pemilih Indonesia 1999”, page 7).
- ✍ *VAB voter education materials were used by other OTI grantees.* YASPPUK reported using some of the VAB materials in their own civic education efforts. “If we wanted to talk about democracy, we would show the video first. Or if we wanted to talk about the general election, we used a video [to introduce the topic].... It’s easier if the women see a film, then talk about the film, and then we ask them about their own opinions.... Because something like democracy is very abstract...and we want to find a way to make it more relevant to their lives” (YASPPUK member).
- ✍ *Maintained independence of PSA messages.* Only 56% of the general public knew that VAB was the group producing the series of PSAs, but 80% of those did know that VAB was an independent organization (Source: “PSA Tracking III/IV/V”, page 8).
- ✍ *VAB developed a system for measuring the impact and appropriateness of their activities.* “We did testing pre and post for each PSA.... We always tested the concept.... For example, the original plan was for Pak Bendot [a character in one of the PSAs] was going to ride in a car, but people said they didn’t have cars, so it was changed to riding a *bejaj* (motorized pedicab in Jakarta). Another

⁸ According to Ms. Yanti Sugarda, VAB.

⁹ See OTI/Indonesia’s “Success Story” about VAB.

¹⁰ See “PSA Tracking III/IV/V”, page 3 which cites 68% spontaneous recognition and 97% guided recognition for the “Registration Version” PSA. Also note, however, that the December 1999 Charney Research and ACNielsen survey found much lower rates of recognition: only 85% of the survey sample reported seeing or hearing any form of voter education, and although the VAB “Make up your own mind” PSA was the most popular, it only was recognized by 62% of the 85%. One reason for the discrepancy may be that Charney surveyed voters and not the general public.

example...Pak Garin [the producer] like to use a lot of symbols, but they were changed to be more realistic” (Ms. Yanti Sugarda, VAB).

Additionally, the Polling Center made contributions to the tracking of election results:

- ✍ Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and information from the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, the Polling Center was able to provide information about the breakdown of voting patterns throughout the country. The information was available on large color-coded maps and also on the Bureau of Statistics’ web page.

✍ *Barriers*

The primary barrier identified which hampered the success of all three election activities was timing. Not only was the general election a fixed event in time, but, as one beneficiary said, “the Indonesian people haven’t received the right kind of voter education in 32 years”. Grantees consistently said that OTI’s programs were *mendadak* (rushed). Some grantees faulted the length of time it took to negotiate and approve a grant, because too little time would remain to implement the program. Nearly all grantees interviewed identified details in implementation, ranging from minor inconvenience to significant barrier, that left room for improvement (please see Annex F more detail).

The secondary barrier identified by grantees was that there was not enough attention paid to planning long-term programs. Discussions with OTI/Indonesia staff clarified that OTI/Indonesia intentionally focuses on short-term programs with potential for high impact, which decreases the likelihood that a single grant will cover a longer time period. Furthermore, several OTI/Indonesia staff said that they had explained the OTI mandate many times with individual grantees. Although most grantees appreciated that OTI provided support for transition programming, their complaints about not getting support for long-term programming suggest that they still do not understand how the OTI mandate differentiates OTI from other sources of funding. Educating grantees on the differences between OTI funding and other funding would alleviate confusion and also set expectations more realistically.

Media Programs

✍ Description of Programs

The FY1999 Media programs overlapped heavily with the Election programs, with the goal of increasing the capacity of local media to cover the election and political events. One example is the training for Journalists on how to cover election issues and voting fraud; this kind of activity was categorized as a primarily election-related activity. Removing the election related media programs, the primary category of media grant activity was in media technical training via Internews.

Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan. The Foundation for the Women's Journal (YJP) developed the first ever radio news program to address gender related issues from political and social perspectives in extended discussion formats.

Internews. Internews provided technical training to 50 radio stations on investigative reporting skills and financial management skills plus providing resources such as equipment. In addition, Internews provided technical expertise to the national parliament on the drafting of the new Indonesian media law.

✍ Impacts

Grantees demonstrated that they acquired new skills as a result of the media training they received. The bulk of grantees comments, however, concerned the implementation of their grants (see Annex F) and the nature of their relationship with the implementing organization. Other impacts included:

- ✍ Increased respect for news programming.* “One of our partner radio stations was intending to sell the station. The owner attended one of our training programs and saw the opportunity to try news bulletins in their programming. When they tried it, their revenues rose. Now they are one of the best stations in their area” (Source: Internews Organizer).
- ✍ Provided examples of news programming.* “The [OTI-sponsored training] helped provide examples of various news bulletins [so that local stations had a model to follow]” (Source: Internews Organizer).
- ✍ Shaped process and content of new media legislation.* With OTI funding, Internews was instrumental in drafting a print press law passed in late 1998, which was the first law to allow the free flow of printed information in Indonesia. More than 200 new publications have been established since this media reform process began. In terms of television, substantial changes were made to the broadcasting laws and five new television stations have been approved, thus doubling the number of private television stations in this fledgling industry.

✍ Lessons Learned

Several lessons were “learned” about OTI's media programs in FY1999 (and many were acted upon in FY2000), including:

- ✍ Integrate training for journalists with training for their managers and media owners.*
- ✍ Print media requires different programming from television and radio.*

- ✍ “We wish that we had made a book for each of our training programs, so that people outside the training program could also learn. If we could make a book for every training program in the future, we will be more effective.... A popular book, not a report, that can be read by regular people or on a university campus.... Maybe people on a campus are confused about how to report on a conflict. Now in the book maybe there is an unusual article about the field experiences of our colleagues in Ternate and Ambon; this article was written by Mr. Thamrin from Universitas Indonesia, and then we try to find how to write about the situation. It explains why you shouldn’t mention the number of victims.... If this could be a book, it would be most unusual. But the funding from OTI wasn’t enough to publish a book” (Media Grantee).
- ✍ “But we learned that having a book isn’t enough” (Media Grantee).
- ✍ “We should have given more on-site training [because it is so successful]” (Grantee).
- ✍ “In media programs, do not underestimate the different areas that need help, such as government, academia, and the media itself. We should have included universities in the media training, so that new journalists coming through the schools would also benefit.... Maybe we could give manuals and tapes to the universities to use.... We should give training straight to university professors of communications and journalism” (Media Grantee).

Civil Society Programs

OTI/Indonesia's Civil Society programs sought to increase the participation of grassroots organizations in the voter education process and to mobilize target populations for peaceful political participation. Civil Society programs also overlapped heavily with Election programs in the months leading to the June 1999 General Election. Civic education activities were sponsored in a variety of media, such as training programs and posters, but also through arts performances and interactive radio broadcasts.

✍ Description of Programs

Examples of Civil Society Programs

LP3ES. The Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Social ("Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information" or LP3ES) funded 22 projects to various civil society organizations during FY1999. Key activities included: providing support to "activate" election monitoring groups (although election monitoring was not a focus of OTI); publishing a book of life stories by women widowed by military violence in Aceh; and supporting SOMASI, an anti-corruption organization.¹¹

PACT. PACT provided civic education programs in two distinct streams. At the grassroots level, PACT provided political education training and sponsored community discussions. In terms of high-profile politics, PACT sponsored debates between old and new political parties, and also meetings between independent and government-sponsored journalists.

Lab-Pol UI. The Political Laboratory of Universitas Indonesia held a four-day empowerment workshop for members of a newly opened municipal parliament in Depok. With complete funding from OTI, the workshop sped up the process of democratization by providing parliament members with role playing exercises on how to react to constituents.

✍ Impacts

There is less evidence for overall program impact in the area of the Civil Society programs as a whole not because individual grants were not successful but because there were few commonalities among the civil society activities included in this assessment.

✍ *Awareness of human rights issues.* A group in Aceh, Yayasan Flower, was able to publish a book including the life stories of women who were widowed by military violence. The book brought human rights issues to the public attention and thus put pressure on groups involved to stop the violence.

✍ *Changed behaviors among civilian and military groups.* In April 1999, a conflict concerning burned shops was likely to lead to escalating military confrontation. Partly as the result of an OTI-sponsored training, the sub-grantees held a meeting with the local government officials and opened discussion between the different groups involved in the conflict. In the end, the military paid for the things destroyed.¹²

¹¹ Examples provided by Mr. Rustam, LP3ES.

¹² According to Mr. Donatus, PACT.

- ✍ *Provided parliament members with timely skills in budgeting.* Parliament members who attended the Lab-Pol UI training received hands-on experience and training in budgeting which they said was perfectly timed to support their first real-life budget planning sessions (Source: Grantee).

Conclusion

From the three high-impact program areas selected for this impact assessment, it is clear that the multifaceted voter and civic education campaign of FY1999 reached a high percentage of the Indonesian population with its messages of participation and democracy through Elections programs. Comments with grantees, activity beneficiaries, and articles published in the local and international news evidence all confirm the anecdotal evidence that the campaign increased the people's confidence in the purpose of the election and encouraged the electorate, especially women, to place votes according to personal beliefs. Although many international donors and local NGOs developed voter education materials and workshops, one sign of OTI's leading role was that all three voter education surveys reviewed in this assessment¹³ found that an OTI-sponsored public service announcement (PSA) was the most memorable and/or meaningful form of voter education available.

The impacts of Media programs were more difficult to isolate in this impact assessment, primarily because of their overlap with the Elections programs. In the media programs, journalists and producers who attended OTI training programs reported that the most important impact was the "upgrading" of their skills. Other impacts include the development of news programs for radio and the proliferation of print and television media (although not the impact of OTI assistance alone). The primary concern among media grantees and sub-grantees was whether the effect of OTI-sponsored media training activities "evaporated" due to the short life spans of the individual activities.

Based on the evidence for this impact assessment, Civil Society programs in FY1999 had positive impacts at the individual activity level; it was not possible to fully evaluate the collective impact of civil society programs because their activities did not have many commonalities. According to civil society groups, the primary benefit of working with OTI was that OTI assistance helped "jumpstart" or accelerate specific activities. The primary concern among civil society groups (and other organizations involved with voter and civic education) was how to maintain the benefits of the voter campaign and then further develop their programs.

Due to resource limitations, this impact assessment does not answer the question of how successful OTI/Indonesia programs are compared to other elections, media and civil society programs.

¹³ See footnote 8.

3. Analysis of Country Program

This chapter discusses some of the overall contributions of the OTI/Indonesia FY1999 program and also presents findings about the operations and grant implementation within OTI/Indonesia.

Country Impact

✍ Overall Contributions to Peace and Democracy

OTI/Indonesia staff members were helpful in identifying the following ways that their programs have contributed to the transition towards peace and democracy in Indonesia.

- ✍ Uncovered cases of corruption.* OTI-funded grants for civil society groups and for media programs helped uncover instances of corruption.
- ✍ Encouraged political debates.* OTI/Indonesia sponsored many dialogues and debates between the 48 political parties leading up to the June 1999 election. Previously, political debates were unheard of in Indonesia.
- ✍ Provided vocabulary about democracy.* OTI/Indonesia funded Public Service Announcements (PSAs, *Iklan Layanan Masyarakat*) which aired on national television and were estimated to have reached 80% of Indonesia's population. These PSAs brought political education to the public attention and also helped provide a vocabulary about democracy to the general public.
- ✍ Supported law reform.* OTI/Indonesia supported grantees that reviewed and drafted laws in Indonesia, such as the new media law and a draft of the regional autonomy law.
- ✍ Developed institutional capacity and management skills.* OTI/Indonesia supported many grantees in their development from a group of people with an idea to an established organization. The OTI mandate seeks to provide rapid assistance in transitions and not to necessarily build institutional capacity. Nonetheless OTI/Indonesia is proud that some of its grantees demonstrated that they could conceptualize and administer high-quality and high-impact programs, and have now been transitioned to sources of funding outside OTI, such as other donors or the Democracy and Governance group of USAID in Indonesia. More specifically, many of OTI/Indonesia's grantees have developed skills in budgeting, bookkeeping, and general behaviors of keeping receipts and being held accountable for expenses.
- ✍ Acted as an incubator for civil society groups.* Specifically, OTI/Indonesia helped create opportunities for emerging civil society groups by taking the risk to fund new groups. Many of the grantees funded by OTI/Indonesia did not have enough institutional capacity to receive funding from other donors. Although OTI's goal is not to specifically develop institutional capacity, many of the grantees that OTI/Indonesia supported did develop those skills and have moved on to new partnerships with UNDP, USAID/Global/DG, or private companies.¹⁴

¹⁴ According to the OTI/Indonesia "Success Story", the Komite Pemberdayaan Pemilih (KPP) later secured funding from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Sampoerna, a national cigarette producer that was able to provide endowed funding ten times as large as the funding KPP had received from OTI. With corporate philanthropy still rare in Indonesia, Sampoerna's support to the KPP represents an important milestone.

✍ Quantitative summary of beneficiaries reached

With the amount of resources devoted to this impact assessment, it was not feasible to research and summarize the beneficiaries that all OTI/Indonesia activities have reached. The following snapshot of the activities selected for this assessment demonstrates that OTI/Indonesia FY1999 activities reached large numbers of the Indonesian population.

Grantee	Program Area	Examples of activities and number of beneficiaries
1. IMW, East Java	Elections	✍ Training on investigative reporting for newspaper journalists: 60 participants as direct beneficiaries; unknown number of newspaper readers who indirectly benefited
2. KPP	Elections	✍ Voter education campaign in tabloid and PSAs in print media: 23 million direct beneficiaries
3. PUSKOWANJATI	Elections	✍ Political education: 250 participants as direct beneficiaries and 30,000 cooperative members as indirect beneficiaries
4. Visi Anak Bangsa	Elections	✍ Television Public Service Announcements (PSA)*: 140 - 180 million television viewers per PSA
5. YASPPUK	Elections	✍ Voter Education Training: 182 participants as direct beneficiaries and 1,571 indirect beneficiaries
6. Internews	Media	✍ Training Activity*: 32 radio professionals ✍ Media Law Assessment: Cannot be quantified ✍ Equipment: 50 radio stations as direct beneficiaries
7. IUC-UGM	Media	✍ Televised political debate: 25 direct audience member beneficiaries; unknown number of television viewers who indirectly benefited
8. LP3ES	Civil Society	✍ Public Opinion Polling Training: 90 journalists ✍ Sub-grant on inter-faith dialogues: 100 participants as direct beneficiaries and unknown number of book readers as indirect beneficiaries
9. PACT	Civil Society	✍ Workshops on political advocacy and participation*: 400 participants ✍ Train the trainer on election monitoring and civic education*: 50 new trainers
10. Yayasan Jurnal Perempuan	Civil Society	✍ Radio broadcast on women's participation in political transition: 13 million listeners as beneficiaries

* This is just an example; many other training programs of this kind were sponsored.

✍ *OTI offers help when grantees need it*

Most grantees interviewed said that OTI helped them provide programs they either could not have done on their own, or helped provide programs much sooner than would have otherwise been possible.

✍ “OTI helped speed up our process of voter education. Our organization already had plans to do some voter education...but we cannot guess how far we would have gotten without OTI assistance” (Source: Grantee).

✍ “OTI was like a midwife helping our voter education efforts be born.... It really helped to have funding that was focused on helping us in this transition time.” “OTI was like our mother and out father because we didn’t exist before we met them” (Source: Grantee).

✍ *Other Contributions*

OTI/Indonesia made other contributions in FY1999 to implementation approaches, communication, performance measurement, and gender integration.

✍ *Decentralized implementation approach.* OTI/Indonesia has provided an example of a decentralized approach to transition assistance. Instead of having two branch offices that report to a central country office in the capital, the field offices in Medan and Surabaya operated more and more independently of Jakarta in FY1999. OTI/Indonesia staff reports that in they are operating more like three field offices in FY2000, each covering a distinct area. The regional independence and autonomy facilitated each office’s ability to provide customized, effective programming.

✍ *Communications.* OTI/Indonesia communicated its vision and contributions to the rest of USAID in the form of an interactive CD-ROM. The CD-ROM provided examples of the popular Public Service Announcements (PSAs) that OTI/Indonesia funded, showed examples of other voter education materials developed, and provided an overview and history of the OTI program in Indonesia. Despite these accomplishments, however, OTI/Indonesia is not well-understood in Indonesia. Perhaps the communications packets could be shared with other donors and potential grantees in order to explain the program’s vision and the implications for Indonesia.

✍ *Performance measurement system developed.* OTI/Indonesia developed an internal database to keep track of all proposed grants, whether approved or not. The database tracks contact information; goals and objectives; intended and actual beneficiaries; and results and impacts for each of OTI/Indonesia’s grants. By developing such a tool, OTI/Indonesia was better able to manage its large portfolio of grants in FY1999 and was also better prepared to respond to information requests.

✍ *Impact scale developed.* OTI/Indonesia developed a scale to measure impact of programs. The scale breaks impact into four distinct aspects: provocativeness; success at reaching target population; timing; and output/follow-on. Having this systematic way of evaluating impact of individual activities has strengthened OTI/Indonesia’s overall methodology to monitor and evaluate its programs. For example, OTI/Surabaya reports that their initial assessment of activities under grant DAIS0003 with Komisi Pendidikan (“Education Commission”) was that it lacked “real” impact. Upon further examination and by using the Impact Assessment Scale, OTI/Surabaya staff found that many other groups used the education materials as the basis for other training programs. Because the materials and their messages gained a larger audience, the activity earned a high score in the aspect of “Follow-on”. OTI records show that other funding decisions could be informed by the specific

evaluation of impact demonstrated in past activities.¹⁵ (Post-script: In early 2000, OTI/Surabaya developed their impact assessment methodology even further by eliciting evaluator's comments concerning a) program design and implementation, and b) demonstration of administration and financial capabilities. This helps distinguish which internal capacities of the grantee are strong and which need support.)

- ✍ *Gender.* OTI/Indonesia, by ensuring that beneficiaries are selected without gender discrimination and are even tracked by gender, has increased awareness of gender in programming. For example, one grant proposed to hold a speech competition where each participating high school would nominate one contestant. When the grantee informed OTI/Indonesia staff that the high schools would be likely to nominate male contestants, OTI/Indonesia staff suggested that each high school be asked to nominate one male and one female contestant to the competition. In another example, a grant proposed an activity for *becak* (pedicab) drivers, who are all men. After consultation with OTI/Indonesia staff, the grantee agreed to revise the proposed activity to include the *becak* drivers' wives in the program. In both of these examples, OTI/Indonesia's commitment to include both men and women as beneficiaries led to programming decisions which benefited men and women in the target community.

Operational Findings

- ✍ *Institutional barriers to program success*

OTI/Indonesia staff identified several institutional barriers to the success of their country program.

- ✍ *Resources pulled to East Timor.* During the late summer and fall of 1999, there has been some drain on the OTI/Indonesia resources in order to respond to the transitions happening in East Timor. During FY1999, many OTI/Indonesia personnel made trips to Timor to assist with OTI efforts there. However, the pull of people and energy has not had a major impact on the OTI/Indonesia program.
- ✍ *Hiring pressure.* Hiring OTI staff to work in the USAID mission took a minimum of three months, which challenged the OTI mandate of acting quickly in response to Indonesia's changing situation. Due to faster hiring processes, the number of staff working for the implementing organization in Indonesia on behalf of OTI (Development Alternatives, Inc.) has grown in response to this hiring pressure.
- ✍ *Management style facilitated speed.* The OTI/Indonesia director's ability to delegate authority facilitated the office's ability to process the number of grants going in and out.
- ✍ *Separate programming and implementation offices hampered cooperation.* Programming staff and implementing staff should work together as closely as possible and their offices should be co-located. Most of the programming decisions were made by OTI staff (mostly Private Services Contractors, PSCs) and most of the grant implementation was handled by Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI). In Medan and Surabaya, the offices were co-located. But in Jakarta, the offices are not able to co-locate because of restrictions about the U. S. Government Mission; the OTI staff are located in the Mission, but DAI staff are not allowed to have offices within the mission.

¹⁵ See DAIS0006 and DAIS0009 for mention of specific disappointments and successes which affected the possibility of additional OTI funding.

✍ Grantee Management

- ✍ Include grant officers (who are responsible for implementation) earlier in discussions about programming.
- ✍ Encouraging grantees to incorporate evaluation of their activities or programs will institutionalize good habits.
- ✍ Increase budget amounts for communication costs in grant proposals.
- ✍ Although there usually is not enough time, it is best to do a two-step evaluation of potential grantees, where one step involves meeting face to face with the OTI implementation staff. This would encourage more realistic expectations.
- ✍ Understanding the grantee's strategy and vision allows for a better fit in programming.

✍ Misunderstandings persist

- ✍ Mistrust about the in-kind mechanism persists.
- ✍ Grantees are confused about how to request for, and justify, changes to the design and implementation of their program.
- ✍ Despite the efforts of OTI/Indonesia staff to communicate their mandate, vision and style, the grantees interviewed for this research demonstrated poor understanding of the OTI mandate. Grantees did show a high level of appreciation for the specific benefits of OTI support (such as speed of approval and delivery, and having programming targeted at a transition), but grantees also expressed disappointment that OTI couldn't emulate the positive characteristics of other donors (such as a commitment to developing institutional capacity). Poor understanding of the OTI mandate may have also contributed to confusion about the specific ways that OTI approached program implementation (see Annex F for example comments).

✍ How to establish a new OTI country program

OTI/Indonesia staff identified several essential steps to establishing a new OTI country program.¹⁶

1. Conduct an initial assessment of the country to determine the "lay of the land". Visit other donors or established non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to understand what kind of programs have been operating and what their plans are for the transition period.
2. Look for existing surveys or studies that demonstrate what is changing and how it is changing in the country. If no surveys exist, commission a survey to serve as a later benchmark. If surveys are not feasible, consider running focus group discussions to provide benchmark information.
3. Quickly design a strategy for the OTI presence. Identify what program areas will have the highest impact.
4. Make an information system, such as a database, to track information about grants and grantees, and make sure all staff use the system from day one. The system does not have to be complicated. (OTI/Indonesia staff started with a spreadsheet in which every row was a separate grant and every

¹⁶ Karma Lively, who contributed most of the ideas to this list, has also worked in two other OTI start-up offices.

column captured the information needed about the grant; over time, this spreadsheet was turned into a database using Microsoft Access.) Keeping track of information is very important, especially if the OTI office will be staffed with Private Service Contractors (PSCs) or otherwise may experience high turnover among staff.

5. Put *all* proposals into the information system. All proposals deserve a professional response, even if they are rejected, and having a system will make it easier to tell if a proposal has already been responded to. Also, it is useful to keep track of the names of the people who have submitted proposals in the past because they may submit another proposal in the future under the name of another organization. Grantee organizations change names quickly in times of transition.
6. Write down instructions on how to use the information system, so that even if there is turnover among OTI staff, there will be a paper trail explaining how and why to find information about grants and grantees. Make sure that *all* OTI staff know how to use the information system.
7. Hold a staff meeting with *all* the OTI staff every six months or so. Including staff of all levels and all responsibilities is important for communication and cohesiveness, especially when the OTI program is still new.
8. If the country program has multiple offices, establish a courier system between the offices. Depending on traffic, the courier could be every day, every other day, or twice a week. The courier will allow the multiple offices to share documents more quickly and dependably.
9. Make an information packet to give to organizations interested in submitting proposals. Include a description of the OTI mandate, how it operates in that country, what program areas the country program is likely to fund, and who to contact for information about submitting proposals.
10. Include grantees as team members in conversations about their proposed grants as much as possible.

✍ How to plan and conduct an impact assessment

Based on the experiences of conducting this impact assessment and feedback from OTI staff, future impact assessment studies should consider the following recommendations:

- ✍ *The impact assessment should be conducted within two months of the end of the fiscal year being studied.* Grantees and OTI/Indonesia staff members found it difficult to remember details about activities that, in some cases, had been implemented 16-18 months earlier. Also, some grantee organizations no longer existed, the primary grantee contact had moved to another organization, or the OTI/Indonesia staff member no longer worked in Indonesia; conducting an impact assessment closer to the period of activity would reduce the risk of institutional knowledge being lost. Furthermore, even in the best of offices, program reports and supporting documents have a tendency to disappear or be more difficult to recreate as time goes on.
- ✍ *Meet with program staff in Washington prior to conducting the assessment.* Washington program staff may be able to compliment the information that the field staff provides; for example, the Washington office may be able to tell some of the history of the office or may have a complete set of program reports and other supporting documents. In particular, meeting with the Washington staff before the assessment is conducted may help orient the researcher.
- ✍ *Conduct the research in the languages grantees prefer and tape record sessions.* Grantees are more likely to feel comfortable providing feedback about their OTI-sponsored work if they have the opportunity to use their native language (or whichever language is appropriate, such as a national language). If the researcher does not have foreign language capabilities, provide a qualified interpreter. If resources allow a team of two or more people, try to employ a combination of in-country and foreign researchers in addition to an interpreter. Record focus group discussions and review the recordings later for content.

- ✍ *Identify other priority research questions that can logically be combined with the impact assessment.* Considerable effort goes into organizing a schedule of interviews and securing grantees' willingness to participate in an impact assessment. There may be additional research questions (such as "what do grantees perceive are the strengths and weakness in the way that OTI implements its programs in country X?") that can be logically combined with the impact assessment in order to maximize the usefulness of the grantees' feedback.

4. Annexes

Annex A: Scope of Work

OTI/Indonesia – Impact Assessment
March 14-24, 2000

Introduction

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) has been asked to conduct an impact assessment of BHR/OTI's activities in Indonesia. This was originally envisaged as a three-week assignment involving 2-3 consultants. The level of effort was subsequently reduced significantly to one consultant for 11 days which has implications for the scope of work. This represents PwC's understanding of the current scope of the assignment and the methodology that will be employed to complete the task.

Background

The USAID Administrator created the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the Bureau of Humanitarian Response (BHR) to assist priority countries make successful transitions from crisis to recovery and stability. Countries experiencing complex crises resulting from internal conflict, civil war, or a natural disaster have special needs that are not addressed by traditional emergency assistance programs. At the same time, traditional development activities are structured to produce results over longer periods of time while failed states need quick assistance giving immediate solutions to restore governance and economic functioning. The volatile political and economic nature of these complex disasters requires fast, emergency-type responses with immediate visible and positive impacts.

BHR/OTI's strategic objectives are based on the premise that fast, direct, and overt political development assistance is needed as a catalyst to move countries beyond crisis to stability. With increasing percentages of U.S. foreign aid going to relieve the humanitarian emergencies that are being caused by civil strife, BHR/OTI is unique among development agencies and International Organizations as being one of the first offices to specifically address the gap between the relief to development continuum.

When a crisis occurs in a priority country, BHR/OTI has the ability to get involved in transition initiatives in that country, which constitute a country program. A country program is designed to address the fundamental constraints that inhibit governance and economic functioning. Usually the removal or amelioration of each constraint is the objective of a project. Each country program has a set of objectives, a set of program performance indicators, an implementation strategy for accomplishing the program objectives, an approved budget, and a plan for periodic program reviews.

BHR/OTI's objectives in country programs are targeted towards reconciliation, reconstruction, and local government capacity building. In order to support such objectives, BHR/OTI's programs encompass such activities as community development, resettlement of internally displaced refugees, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into society, human rights monitoring, and the creation and revitalization of political and social institutions to promote a return to economic and social normalcy. The purpose of this position is to serve as a vital and integral part in the Office of Transition Initiatives, Bureau of Humanitarian Response, BHR/OTI.

During last year's review of OTI's worldwide impact, results, and lessons learned (through the Results Review and Resource Request, R4), OTI made a commitment to USAID to conduct "impact assessments" in its priority countries to better demonstrate effectiveness and methodology.

Objectives and Scope of Activity

The purpose of this activity is to assess the impact of BHR/OTI's country transition programs in Indonesia in order to: identify critical field activities; collect data and other information that demonstrates results; and report on whether and how BHR/OTI's contributions have assisted the transition to peace and democracy. The report will be timed and designed to provide key information for BHR/OTI's Results Reporting document and other reports. The term "impact" is used to mean: changes that occur as a result of BHR/OTI activities, which can be substantiated by the collection of data (qualitative or quantitative) on which a conclusion can be made. This should be an honest appraisal of OTI's impact, and include both positive and negative results.¹⁷

This assessment has four main objectives:

1. To identify key field programs for review during the assessment. "Key" is used here to mean those programs that the field staff believe are already achieving significant results, those programs that are considered priority areas for achieving results, and/or those programs that have received the attention of important U.S. Government staff or local officials. The term "program" can mean strategic areas within an OTI Country Strategy (e.g., alternative media; civil-military relations) or it can mean activities (e.g., funding of a specific radio station in a rural area).
2. To collect qualitative and/or quantitative data on those principal field programs/activities through key informant interviews, focus groups, and secondary source material (both collected in the field and elsewhere).
3. To provide a qualitative and quantitative review of data on the impact/results of key field programs.
4. To provide a brief analysis of the entire emergency transition program, with a focus on incorporating major findings from the impact assessment.

Methodology

The consultant will assess the impact of OTI's programs in three main areas:

- ✍ Media campaign
- ✍ Elections
- ✍ Emerging civil society groups

Because of time constraints the consultant will visit two sites – Jakarta and Surabaya – where OTI activities are being implemented. While OTI also had significant activity in Medan during FY99, the consultant will not visit this site because of time constraints and also because staff in the Medan office are less able to devote time to this exercise at the present time.

The consultant will employ the following techniques to conduct the assessment

- ✍ **In-depth Interviews** : The consultant will conduct in-depth interviews with OTI staff, principal grantees (DAI, Internews, PACT, Asia Foundation and LP3ES) and local NGOs implementing OTI activities . This will help to identify "key" programs in OTI/Indonesia's portfolio and to understand

¹⁷ For negative results, the assessment should indicate how OTI's programs are adjusting to improve impact. Last year, OTI's honesty in the R4 document was singled out as a best practice for the rest of the Agency.

the intended and actual goals of grantees and NGOs, as well as OTI and its grantees perspectives on strengths and weaknesses in program implementation.

- ✍ **Focus Groups:** The focus group technique will be utilized to obtain the perspective of beneficiaries of OTI programs. Because of time constraints only a few focus groups will be conducted. However, the consultant will strive to conduct 3 focus groups in Jakarta (one for each of the three program areas – media, elections, and civil society groups) and 2 focus groups in Surabaya (1 each for the two main program areas in Surabaya). See attached work plan for proposed schedule of focus groups. OTI/Jakarta and OTI/Surabaya will need to set up the focus groups prior to the consultant's arrival. This logistical support will greatly facilitate the consultant accomplishing as much as possible during the short time in the field.
- ✍ **Review of Database/secondary source material:** The consultant will also review OTI's grantee database as well as any other material provided by OTI and/or grantees. It is hoped that this review will yield information that will provide a more quantitative perspective on results.

It should be noted that because of time constraints, the consultant would not be able to conduct a scientifically accurate impact assessment. There will be heavy reliance on anecdotal/qualitative evidence – particularly in assessing program impact on beneficiaries. In addition, this qualitative information will be based on a limited number of focus groups. However, the consultant will strive to balance this with as much quantitative information as is available from OTI and its grantees.

Deliverables

The consultant will deliver the following to OTI.

- ✍ Methodology and workplan (already done)
- ✍ Mid-term briefing with OTI/Jakarta on Friday March 17th
- ✍ Exit briefing and draft report on Friday March 24th to OTI/Jakarta
- ✍ Briefing, final report and trip report to OTI/Washington

PwC Performance/TEX2000 Code : 513871597700

Approved to proceed as described:

CTO

Date

Annex B: Interview Guide

✍ Focus Groups Discussions with Beneficiaries

(translated from the Indonesian interview guide)

Introduce myself:

- ✍ My name is Elizabeth, and I am a consultant from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, a international company that is involved in many different fields
- ✍ We are conducting some research about the time before the general elections in 1999 and also about the implementation of some of the OTI programs.
- ✍ And I need to explain why I am speaking Indonesian. I used to live in Yogyakarta when I was teaching at Gadjah Mada University. I ask for you understanding and patience if I say some things wrong or my Indonesian otherwise isn't as good as yours.

Purpose of this discussion:

- ✍ Is to find out your honest opinions about the impact of the program to you individually and to your organization

Let's introduce ourselves. Please say

1. Your name
2. Where you are from or where you live
3. How many children you have
4. What your hobbies or interests are

Here are the "rules" for our discussion:

5. Let's talk one at a time
6. There are no wrong answers
7. Respect each other's opinions
8. We don't need to have consensus in the group; having different opinions is allowed
9. If you give permission, I will use a tape recorder, but it is only to help me when I have to make my report. Since Indonesian isn't my native language, it will be very difficult if I have to ask questions, listen to you answers, and also write them down. Do you give permission?
10. I am here just to facilitate the conversation. You don't have to try and make me happy with the things you say.
11. We are scheduled to talk for 1 or 2 hours
12. The opinions you give here will not influence proposals or grants that you submit to OTI. OTI needs your feedback to that they can make their programs better and run more smoothly.

General Election 1999:

13. What did the election mean and why was there an election?
14. Why were there political parties; what was their role?
15. How could you tell if the election went well?
16. When will there be another election? What do you hope for in that election?
17. According to you, what is most important in the election?

General media programs

18. What was the goal of your program?
19. Who did the program target as beneficiaries?
20. What are the results and influences of the program?
21. What can we study from the program; what are the lessons learned?

22. What was the role of the media in the election? Why?
23. What kinds of media do the Indonesian people trust the most, and like the most?
24. What kind of challenges did the media face then, and now?
25. Do you think that the media fulfilled its role in the time before and after the election?
26. How can you measure the success of media in Indonesia?
27. What is most important in media?

Democracy

28. According to you, what does democracy mean? Why, and how important is it to you?
29. Is democracy the most appropriate system for Indonesia? Why or why not?
30. What's most important in a democracy?

✍ Grantee Interviews and Roundtable Discussions

What is the purpose of this evaluation?

- ✍ To find out the effects and influences from the programs that OTI has sponsored
- ✍ To assess the impact of OTI programs in: Media, Election Support, and Civil Society Groups
- ✍ This is not an evaluation of you as an individual or as a grantee or as a person who has run programs with OTI.
- ✍ My research is focused on the time period from October 1998 to September 1999.

Self-introduction: who am I and why am I here doing this evaluation?

- ✍ I am Elizabeth, a consultant from PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, an international that works in a few different fields
- ✍ Yes, PwC is the company that is famous in Indonesia for the auditing scandal with BancBali. But I am not an auditor!
- ✍ I work in the area of economic development and have been working for USAID/Washington with their systems of performance measurement and evaluation in Washington
- ✍ Why am I here conducting this research?
 - 1) Because I have experience with Indonesia
 - 2) Because I have experience with USAID in Washington
 - 3) Because I don't have experience with OTI and it's programs. In this way, hopefully I can be more honest and objective in conducting this evaluation
- ✍ And I also have to explain why I can speak Indonesian. I used to live in Yogyakarta while I was teaching at Gadjah Mada University. I ask for your understanding and patience if I say some things wrong or my Indonesian otherwise isn't as good as yours.

Identifying the key activities of your program

- a. What is the goal of your organization?
- b. Did you receive all your funding in FY1999 (10/98 – 9/99) from OTI?
- c. What kind of help did you receive from OTI and when did you receive it?

Goals of programs

- d. What was the goal of those activities?

Beneficiaries

- e. Who was the beneficiary of the program? Who was the program targeted for?

Lessons learned

- f. What can be learned from this program? What are the lessons learned?

Plans to measure impact?

- g. OUTCOMES. How did you monitor the results of the program? (For example, by counting the total number of people who attended a training, or counting the number of brochures that were distributed)
- h. IMPACTS. How can you measure the impact of the program? (For example, by following the participants to find out how many of them actually vote in the election, or by conducting research to compare the quality of work of journalists before and after a training program)
- i. What wouldn't you have been able to do without support from OTI?
- j. What do you think your programs have contributed towards the process of reaching peace and democracy in Indonesia?

Barriers

- k. What kinds of barriers did you experience?
- l. According to you, what could still be improved in OTI, in terms of programming?
- m. Did OTI/DAI/Internews disappoint you? In what way?

Management, implementation, and administration

- n. How often did you talk to OTI by telephone?
- o. What is good about the implementation system of OTI?
- p. What could still be improved in the grant implementation process?
- q. What are the lessons learned from OTI implementation?
- r. Do you have other suggestions for OTI?

OTI Goal

- s. according to what you understand, what is the goal or mandate of OTI?

Handover / Sustainability

- t. Does your organization have a plan to seek funding from other sources?
- u. Is your organization self-sufficient? In which activities?

Extra

- v. Did OTI attend your events?
- w. Do you have any documents that illustrate the impact of your program?

Annex C: List of Interviewees and Focus Group Participants

Program Area	Grantee	Individuals
--	OTI/Jakarta	Ms. Karma Lively, Country Program Manager Ms. “Patty” Patricia Friedman, Country Program Manager Ms. Zullia Saida, Project Development Specialist Mr. Sarjono
--	OTI/Surabaya and DAI/Jakarta	Ms. Laurie Pierce, Program Manager Ms. Ketty Kadarwati, Program Development Specialist
--	DAI Jakarta	Mr. Gerald F. Becker, Country Director Ms. ??, Grants Manager Ms. Erica L. Kirwen, Program Manager Mr. Sofyan Lubis, Grants Manager
Election	IMW Organizers, Grantee Interview in Surabaya	Ms. Nany Wijaya, <i>Jawa Pos</i> and <i>Suara Indonesia</i> Mr. Didik Mr. Luthfi Subagio, Editor <i>Suara Indonesia</i>
Election	IMW Beneficiaries, Focus Group Discussion in Surabaya	Mr. Kolis (Tabloid, <i>Berita Politik Aliansi</i>) Mr. Ribut Wahyudi, Editor-in-Chief/Operational Manager (Newspaper, <i>Indonesian Daily News</i>) Mr. Agus Supartono (<i>Majalah Berita Mingguan</i> , “Weekly News Magazine”) Mr. Riza Arief Taufani, Reporter (Tabloid, <i>Oposisi</i>)
Election	PUSKOWANJATI, Grantee Interview in Surabaya	Mr. Arifin Hasyim, Manager Ms. S. Untari Bisowarno Mr. Agus Irawan
Election	PUSKOWANJATI Beneficiaries, Focus Group Discussion in Surabaya	Ms. Yayuk Ms. Tet/Chandra Ms. Eflin Ms. “Marli” Hari Soejanti Sumarli, Organizer of <i>Yayasan Ibu Mojokerto</i> (Foundation of Women in Mojokerto City)
Election	YASPPUK, Grantee Round Table Discussion in Jakarta	Ms. Titik Hartini Mr. M. Firdaus
Election	Visi Anak Bangsa, Grantee Round Table Discussion in Jakarta	Ms. Mariza Ms. Yanti B. Sugarda
Election	Komite Pemberdayaan Pemilih, Grantee Round Table Discussion in Jakarta	Mr. Rudy Harisyah Alam
Media	Internews, Grantee Interview in Jakarta	Ms. Aya Muchtar Ms. Mita Witaksono Ms. Yuki Mr. Teddy Mr. Lance Ms. Kathleen
Media	Internews Beneficiaries, Focus Group Discussion in Jakarta	Ms. Laila Mirza (Radio, Mara Bandung) Mr. H. Sofwy Irvan (Radio Reks)

Program Area	Grantee	Individuals
		Mr. Luki (Radio, MSTri FM Jakarta) Mr. “Yosi” M. Taufiq NR, General Manager (Radio, TOP FM Bali)
Media	Internews Beneficiary and also grantee, Focus Group Discussion in Jakarta	Ms. Gadis Arivia, Executive Director (Magazine and Radio, <i>Jurnal Perempuan</i>) Ms. Riana (Magazine and Radio, <i>Jurnal Perempuan</i>) Mr. “Boni” Nur Iman Subono, Vice-Director (Magazine and Radio, <i>Jurnal Perempuan</i>)
Media	Suara Surabaya, Vendor and Beneficiary, Interview	Mr. Errol Jonathans (Broadcast Director, Radio Suara Surabaya)
Civil Society	LP3ES, Grantee Interview in Jakarta	Mr. Rustam Ibrahim, Senior Advisor and past Managing Director
Civil Society	PACT, Grantee Interview in Jakarta	Mr. Donatus K. Marut, Director of Indonesian Rapid Response Initiative (IRRI) at PACT Mr. Max Sambanju, Director of Finance and Development
Civil Society	IUC-UGM, Grantee Round Table in Jakarta	Ms. Evi
Civil Society	Atmajaya University, Grantee Round Table Discussion in Jakarta	Mr. Andre Ata Ujan
Civil Society	Laboratorium Politik Universitas Indonesia (Lab-Pol UI), Grantee Round Table Discussion in Jakarta	Mr. Andrinof CH. Ms. Sri B. E. Wardhani

*The Asia Foundation members who had direct knowledge of the election grant with OTI had since left the TAF/Indonesia program.

Annex D: Condensed Transcript -- Impact Feedback

The researcher, a native speaker of English and a fluent speaker of Indonesian, conducted the interviews and focus group discussions in whichever language the group being interviewed preferred. (All focus group discussions ended up being held in Indonesian and about half of the interviews were in Indonesian.) All the Indonesian-language focus groups and interviews were tape recorded; the researcher reviewed all the recorded conversations and translated/transcribed comments of particular value to this assessment.

The statements below are organized by theme, but are otherwise in random order. Where references to a particular grantee's purpose or history was relevant, the reference was left complete; in all other statements, references to the details of the grant are omitted in order to preserve the confidentiality of the speaker.

✍ *Impact: Overall contributions to peace and democracy*

- ✍ We don't want to claim [that our activity had] an impact on democracy.... But at least this was the first time there was voter education!
- ✍ In a democratic process, people can have different opinions from each other, in a peaceful way. I believe it is the role of the media to spread that message. The media is supposed to spread information but can also spread education.... If media can cover stories of conflicts in a good way and can say that having different opinions is *wajar* (normal), then the people will become used to having differences without turning them into conflicts.
- ✍ With our training, the politicians were encouraged to be more rational.... How to respect other opinions.
- ✍ I believe media is the fourth arm, after the executive, legislative, and administrative arms of government. With a good media, the people will be trained to think on their own and not to cause conflicts; with a media that is fair, the people will be used to seeing the basis of problems. Media can also monitor the government better so that you don't hear those stories any more of a journalist who was paid in order to publish a certain opinion, or a journalist who was paid by the government not to uncover a case of corruption. We need to upgrade our fellow journalists so that they have a loyalty...to democracy.
- ✍ Nowadays, democracy is happening with the language of demonstrations. The government seems only to change if language of demonstrations happens. We see that during the time of Soeharto...I see that the people's welfare was, um, kind of safer and nicer. I mean that Now people act however they want, breaking things. I've even asked myself, "maybe this isn't the moment yet...for the Indonesian people to experience things like this...." Maybe it was *keliru* (wrong) when the students *menjatuhkan* (threw) Soeharto down in that way. If the succession hadn't happened that way in Indonesia, who knows but maybe Indonesia would be better off right now. ...Because maybe if political education were given in an organized way and continuously, maybe the people would have a chance to understand it better. But if it was like last year, maybe because everybody was just thinking of themselves, and maybe it's just spoiled the politics.... You know, now that I look back...little by little people held demonstrations. Hanging out on top of the parliament building for three weeks is actually vandalism...it's not a democratic way. I worry that this country won't stay together.... [The beneficiary gave two more examples of current political problems that went unresolved until there were demonstrations to attract attention and then were resolved.]
- ✍ But I think that Soeharto wouldn't have come down unless he was forced to step down.... Now I think the idea of demonstration is being misunderstood, like demonstrations that *ngawur* (are all wrong). Actually, demonstrations are good, *asal* (as long as) they have rules...about safety.... Nowadays it's like "*asal* (as long as) there's a demonstration". According to me, we are still in a time of learning, [because it's a transition] towards a democracy.... People think that they are free to do as they like [because it's a democracy]....

- ✍ For 32 years we didn't ever get any political education that was good.... I don't think it really matters who becomes our president, that's not really the problem. I think the problem is the elite groups; maybe they have desires of their own and they want certain things that are important to their group. But the people, I think as long as the president can bring about their welfare, I think that is enough.
- ✍ Things looked safe for so long, but actually behind all that, there were a lot of problems.... Now that things are more open, all the bad things show up now. For example, we haven't seen much about hunger and now we see people are going hungry.... So it's not that things are worse now, but now this is the era of making things better....
- ✍ [For all this time] it's been the opinions of the people on top that have given us shape/direction, not the people shaping the leaders from below. Then at the moment that we the people were finally set free, we were like water [pouring through a dam] and then everything *keblablasan* (went too far). And it *merugikan* (damages) everyone on all sides.... But then we have to remember why it happened; yes, because for so many years we [were taken advantage of]. It was neutralizing.... Actually democracy is supposed to be respecting other people's opinions.... Our training also allowed [the beneficiaries] the chance to bond as a group.... We always regrouped them in mixed groups with people of other parties.... I think this challenged them to be politicians with a more professional attitude.... Also, on the last day we finished at 9 pm and they didn't want to go home, and they said they wanted to sing karaoke!

✍ *Election: Perceived meaning of election process*

- ✍ The election was for us to choose the next president and to participate in a democracy.... Compared to previous elections, this election didn't have a lot of pressure, not that there wasn't any pressure, to vote in certain ways.
- ✍ We had a lot of political parties so that we could find out approximately which one could represent us.
- ✍ Now it's like we are free to choose how to vote...it's very different from how it was before.
- ✍ I'm sure there are some people who aren't satisfied with the results of the general election, but I think that there were more people who were satisfied, meaning who could accept the results of the election.
- ✍ What do most villagers hope from an election? That it runs smoothly, that it is safe and doesn't spark murders, that the harvests still come, and that the children can go to school. Yes, including me too, this is what I hope for!

✍ *Election: Impact of voter education*

- ✍ I also saw a kind of *keberanian* (confidence or gutsy-ness) emerge in the women who attended [the political education program] because of the sheer numbers of women gathered. Individually, most of the women did not have the guts to speak out. But after gathering in a group of 200-300, they said intelligent things of high quality in loud voices.
- ✍ An impact from the voter education was clear in the field...there were some changes in the mindset of the [beneficiaries].... They are asking questions, not just about the election, but also about wider subjects.
- ✍ [One of the beneficiaries] realized and said to me, "oh our country is in debt, and it is a large debt" because before they didn't know that there were loans financing development.... They say those things in their own language.
- ✍ The impact on behavior we can see a little bit in the numbers of people who volunteered to be observers/witnesses for election day.
- ✍ Maybe other women are different from me...because they are already smart about politics. But for me, I was blind and I didn't know anything about politics at all [before the OTI-sponsored event]. So this kind of education seminar opened my mind to politics and made me more mature about politics. It felt very useful. I really hope we can have it again and I can learn some more. In my region, there

really aren't a lot of people who know about politics. [After we went home from the event, people changed from not understanding at all to] saying "oh, in politics is like this or like that" or "oh, a women's coalition is like this or like that."

- ✍ Before the training, people said they didn't know what KPU was or the mechanism for choosing the president. And there was a debate, does the person who wins the election automatically become the president, or do they become the head of the parliament?
- ✍ The speakers [from the political parties who attended the OTI-sponsored workshop] weren't high quality enough. I don't know if it is the fault of [the grantee's organizing committee] or the individual political parties. The representatives who came weren't very high quality. ...And also, many of the big parties didn't even show up. [One of the parties] did have some programs for women, and the representative they sent was pretty good quality. But the others, they weren't high quality at all. ...There was dialogue [with the parties who showed up], and we asked about the empowerment of women. ...We asked which ones would listen to the voices of women if they were elected.
- ✍ [About this gender thing, you see, all the representatives chosen for the political parties were men this time.] ...So women at the seminar and in this organizing committee and women in general have to put pressure on the political parties so that they can become members of the political parties.
- ✍ The seminar had the impact of making those men [the members of the political parties who attended the workshop] a little more open minded. So that they will give women an opportunity in the election.
- ✍ Yes, and we also realized that we [as women] have to change a little bit so that we can participate more [in politics].
- ✍ We know that we have rights, but...politics is still taboo. And so many women think that politics is dirty.... There was a kind of *mudeng* (new realization). [With the OTI-sponsored workshop] we could realize that actually it's not just men who can be representatives of political parties but women can be representatives too.
- ✍ It's sad that this kind of political education [like the kind that OTI sponsored] was so late.... Women who had potential didn't have enough time to get ready...to join the political parties.... But the next election! ...And the biggest portion, 57%, of the electorate is women.... It's just that the [political education] was late.
- ✍ The most interesting thing [about the political education program] was that as the participants asked questions in different directions, we encouraged them to think about politics in terms of how the political parties responded to their offers and requests, not in terms of which party they needed to follow. And the participants really understood this nuance.
- ✍ I got a lot of protest from the political party representatives who came [to the workshop and political party dialogue]. They said, "hey, we didn't come here to be judged...especially not by a bunch of women." They weren't real high quality political representatives, and when they saw a bunch of women they didn't want to respect the women. They also assumed that the women were pawns of [the grantee organization] and had been told what to ask or say.... And in this way the politicians were *ketahuan* (exposed) because it was obvious that the parties didn't have programs for women.
- ✍ One of the results of the [political education] program was confidence, so that women could say "if you [a political party] don't have any programs for me, then I don't need to vote for you".
- ✍ One way that we can see long-term changes in [the beneficiaries'] thinking is by listening to the conversations among members every month when we visit our member groups. Now they are very enthusiastic if we mention politics. Sometimes they mention things first, like "how come those ethnic riots in Ambon are still going on?" And they talk together about things like that. We see this at their meetings, and we hear these things from their regular members and the leaders of our member organizations.
- ✍ I think now [the beneficiaries] are more confident to say "no". This is very positive. They criticize conditions around them. Their comments are not just about politics but sometimes also about the administration of their local cooperative group/association too. According to me, this is very positive.

Maybe policy changes and decisions used to just come down from above without any explanation, but now...members sometimes quote the bylaws of the organization or otherwise ask questions if there is a problem. So the life of the cooperatives themselves have been affected. There have also been a couple of groups of women who have met on their own to talk more in depth about politics. This all happened after the [political education] program [that OTI sponsored].

- ✍ But it's not certain that women will necessarily be high-quality politicians who will pay attention [to women's issues].... As long as men [who are elected] can pay attention [to women's issues] that's not a problem.
- ✍ What's clear is that this kind of political education has to be done again!
- ✍ Since we had this political education program...now when there are meetings, we can include a little bit of political education on the side.
- ✍ Yes, there are some women who don't want to receive this kind of political education, but there are more that want it now than those who don't.... Their minds have been opened. Maybe they can be opened further.
- ✍ One of the things that I saw from the [political education] program was a kind of *pembukaan wawasan* (opening their perspective) in many women into the political arena. You see, for all this time most women in Indonesia have had an "allergy" to politics. For 32 years none of us (men or women) were allowed to talk about politics. Women have been *dikendalikan* (~corralled/funneled into) social organizations based on their husbands' official jobs [note: like "wives of employees of company X"], and then they haven't had the independence to choose a political party they wanted to vote for on their own. By having this kind of education, the participants were taught how to choose which political party would support women's aspirations, and which party, if elected, would actually project the voices/concerns of women thereafter. We found out which parties *peduli* (cared about or paid attention to) women.

✍ *Media: Role of Media in Indonesia*

- ✍ I think the media in general has a large influence/role in this era after President Soeharto *lengser* (was forced to step down); before, the media was under a lot of pressure from the old regime and then [after President Soeharto stepped down], the media was given wide freedoms. But then of course there are two effects. This first effect was good, that the people could have information, and the flow of information would never be turned off. But then...where are the limits that need to be given to the media to limit what they give the people? Yes, I think in this way there has been a positive and a negative effect [of the recent press freedoms]. It's like the media in the era of President Soeharto was a horse in a stable. Media in this era after President Soeharto is like a horse that escaped; meaning that the media doesn't always have a direction to run in...because [we] were never let out [of the stable] before. So I think the media is very important now. [The beneficiary then talks about the how important the media is in mediating differences in power; unfortunately the specific words are unintelligible.]
- ✍ In Indonesia, the first role of the media is to give information and the second role is to provide political education. Before the media [freedoms] were opened by President Habibie [in 1998], the media was under a lot of pressure.... Controlling the government is an important function of the media.
- ✍ Media is like a faucet here...when the faucet was opened, a lot of new media poured out...and not always of good quality.... [It takes a process of learning.] Yeah, learning like we got in the investigative reporting training; it showed us how to cover stories.
- ✍ Media in Indonesia was very weak. There was a feeling of euphoria. We were thinking that if things continued in that way, maybe the media would become a tyranny.... We thought that we could start with training about democracy, because with smart writers, the readers could trust the papers.
- ✍ We also trained the managers from the papers.
- ✍ Demand for the trainings exceeded supply.

✍ I believe that media is a fourth power in a democracy, after legislative, executive and judicial powers. And I think that the media is the most effective tool for controlling power. For example, I think the impact of the students' movement against President Soeharto's regime [in May 1998] could not be separated from the impact of the media in covering the story. The people could learn that intellectual groups, that were known as pro-reformation groups, didn't like the Soeharto regime.... Now all those [messages] were given to the people via the mass media, to the point that people found out that Soeharto stepped down through the media. That's what I mean by saying that the media has a large and effective influence against power.... In this era of President Habibie and then President Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid] I think we can start to feel the freedom of the press. It used to be that if, for example, we wanted to cover a story about *keburukan* (problems) in some kind of organization, we would be threatened by the military. Now it's not that way. Now the people are more critical and now know more about the problems of the country and their rights. So the media is helping control the government. If we want a real democracy, the media has to be *dihidupkan* (given life) and freedom.

✍ *Media: Which forms of media do the Indonesian people trust and why?*

✍ I think the people are still *melek* (opening their eyes). People like to read newspapers, followed by watching television. [Why do they like to read the newspaper?] Yeah, maybe it's because it's relatively cheap, or they can borrow the paper from someone else. And you can bring the paper with you anywhere. You see, with television, if we are talking about a political program or political news, it might only be a one-hour program, maybe [repeated] three times in a day. But people are busy, right, and they don't like to wait for the television schedule. But a newspaper can be kept in the car, in the house, on your bicycle, or even inside your shirt. So maybe you don't have the chance to watch television, and maybe you find out from your friend that [you just missed] some interesting news on the television.... But at night, of course it's different, because people are just *nganggur* (hanging out).

✍ In terms of giving information, I think people trust the newspapers.

✍ The function of television [in Indonesia] isn't really to give information.... As soon as people mention the word "newspaper", people think of news, not entertainment. But television is equated with entertainment...and it makes people think of the *sinetron* (soap operas) and shows about celebrities.

✍ Part of our people, like in the cities, maybe like the television. But the rest of the people, like in my area, like reading [daily] newspapers...or weekly papers. For example, if there is a story, such as President Soeharto stepping down, a weekly paper has a chance to give reasons why he stepped down, and the news is more in-depth...and includes lots of opinions from experts...and it is more complete news. Even though the television has [lots of news, many times a day], people don't feel *puas* (like they have gotten enough news) until they read about it later.... As proof, look at our high readership rates for newspapers....

✍ One of our barriers in media right now is that we have a lot of trouble deciding which stories to cover or to [put in the headlines]. If, for example, President Gus Dur [Abdurrahman Wahid] says one thing in the morning and then says something different in the afternoon..., which story do we emphasize?

✍ We also have a difficulty because the price of newspapers is going up.... Even if the price of a weekly paper went up just 1,000 Rupiah, we would have readers who stopped buying the paper.

✍ [During the campaign season], when we wrote something bad about a particular political party, they would send people to our office to threaten us.

✍ We also had difficulty covering 48 political parties...so many! We sometimes had to skip the small parties because they didn't have any interesting events to cover.

✍ The role of media going in to the election was very important. As we learned in the training we got about polling...we saw how the public opinion can change.... Before, if women wanted to vote, they just voted the way their husbands voted.... But now with the media giving information saying that women also have equal rights, that women can vote on their own, and that women can try to have

their aspirations heard, we see that more women voted on their own.... Now the women could read in the paper and see which party they liked [without the pressure from] their religious leaders or husbands. I think the media had many important roles going in to the election.

- ✍ The people sometimes only found out that, for example, a certain party's representative had a criminal record, from the media.
- ✍ Or we found cases that the number of registered voters in an area was more than the current living population...because dead people were included in the list of registered voters. Those cases were only publicized after we covered those stories. I think these things were very important going into the election.
- ✍ After the election, and the government was elected, our role was not to control the government so much as it was to make sure that the political education didn't disappear. We want to make sure that the people are more aware of politics before the next election in five years.
- ✍ Everything was so *mendadak* (rushed) before the election.
- ✍ The election didn't cause bloodshed, so in that way I think it was a success.
- ✍ The political education wasn't finished before the election...it's still going on now.
- ✍ I don't think the rules governing media were quite ready before the election. I suppose the media was effective at controlling [the government]....
- ✍ Our offices received bomb threats from [several of the large] political parties. So now there is a little bit of *tidak berani* (non-confidence) if we cover those big parties. Maybe for some of the other parties too.

✍ *Media: Important in covering conflicts*

- ✍ Media is also important because of its role in covering conflicts...because it can fuel conflicts.... Our writing can cause a new conflict to arise. For example, I am Muslim. If I...always covered stories and took the side of the Muslim people in the story, I wouldn't be objective. That's the importance of the new knowledge the reporters [received in the OTI-sponsored training] so that their writing provides fresh stories for the people.
- ✍ During President Soeharto's era, the media was basically forbidden to write about the *Keluarga Cendana* (the President's family/circle), the military, and SARA (relations between different tribes, religions, races, and ethnic groups). Today, the first two are not really a problem anymore and the media can cover all kinds of stories. But for the SARA problems, the media has to be really careful. You see, Indonesia is still multi-ethnic and multi-racial, so if we expose problems too wide, the conflicts among the people on the bottom can be really *tajam* (mean).
- ✍ We used to be afraid to write about SARA because of the quote-unquote censors. Nowadays we are also hesitant to write about SARA but it is because of our own awareness that we can [add fuel to the fire] of some problems. [We have to be very careful of encouraging a cascade/domino effect of revenge.]
- ✍ I have a story about the training on how to cover conflicts.¹⁸ Like the case of murders that happened in Ambon between Protestant and Muslim communities. Now we can't write about this in a vulgar way. If we say that 1000 Muslims people have been murdered, and we describe it in a vulgar way, maybe we will worsen the problem and *menacing* (fish around) and maybe some churches in Java [a different province] would get burned [in revenge]. We want to avoid that kind of problem.... We can say "two groups of people carried weapons and clashed" but we don't really need to say what their religion is.... Or, maybe it would be an interesting story to say that "Protestant victims were carried to safety by members of a *pesantren* (Islamic school)"; now that would be an interesting story. If there is a theme/sense of peace, we want to expose it.

¹⁸ This activity was held in FY2000 but some of the planning occurred in FY1999.

✍ *Media: “Upgrading” people is important*

Media grantees in the media and election programs described OTI/Indonesia’s greatest contribution as “upgrading” their *Sumber Daya Manusia* (the capacities of their human resources, i.e. people).

- ✍ It turns out that the biggest portion of our people live in rural areas. Jakarta and the other cities only have a small percentage. So then issues having to do with the election like *kecurangan* (cheating) and how to ensure the physical safety of reporters while they covered stories with the correct facts...all this required a process.... The first thing we needed was human resources...the second thing of course was funding as well.... Investigation needed those two factors, human resources and funding.
- ✍ About the quality of the human resources of reporters.... Someone once said to me that reporters could be divided into categories...those who are ideal, those who are looking for a regular salary, and, I’m sorry, even those that are like prostitutes looking for anyone to pay for their stores.
- ✍ The more that the reporters are upgraded and more skilled, the more that the people are helped.
- ✍ You have to remember that reporters have different educational backgrounds--education, politics, accounting, and so forth. So it takes time to get us all up to speed on and interested in politics.

✍ *Media: Impact of programs*

- ✍ The important thing was that the training showed us how to uncover *kecurangan* (abuses and cheating) about the election.
- ✍ Here is a story about monitoring. Bawean is a small island, I think 12 hours by boat. Some of the voting cards were already punched and the results were publicized and even before the voting hours started! So the newspapers told the story so that people on other islands could find out about it. That really helped the people.
- ✍ We have 300 alumni [journalists], each of which have thousands of readers.... Imagine the impact....
- ✍ Our friends who came to the training told stories about [the problems] in each of their provinces, and so we really found out what was going on there.... I know it’s not ideal, but [we made some progress towards] the process of peace....
- ✍ At the training, we got to meet with real reporters from those troubled areas.... It turns out that there were some details we hadn’t been told. For example, in that example of the murders of 1,000 people of each religion, it turns out that the way they were murdered was exactly the same. So now we suspect that the whole conflict was *dibuat* (made up) by someone outside those two groups. Because no way would two different groups murder in the exact same way.... By meeting reporters from outside Java, we could better understand their perspective.... And now we realize it isn’t appropriate for us to cover their stories without their participation.... It was a kind of correction for us.
- ✍ Also we made a network of colleagues.... Because we have met so many times at these training programs, we have talked on our own and made our own network. It wasn’t a direct [intended] impact of the program.
- ✍ [The OTI-sponsored training on investigative reporting] had three themes. About the election, yes, automatically the training familiarized us with the new political rules and the whole election system of proportional voting and the districts; that was according to the theory and the new laws. Second, we got information from some important figures in the community...who were very vocal about discussing some of the cheating that happened in their areas, such as someone...who told stories about election monitoring in the old times. Third, we had the chance to make friend and informal professional networks...so that we would monitor the elections together.
- ✍ Also, we learned about the changes and impacts that resulted from our news stories. We learned about the public opinion about issues. The public’s trust in the media could also be measured after we went to the polling training.
- ✍ We did do some polling about some issues, especially about public opinions.

- ✍ Polling has two functions: to provide new information, and to correct [something that's wrong]. It used to be that polling was done with poor standards. Now we can correct our method of conducting polling.
- ✍ From the polling training, I learned about the role that media has in spreading information about the election. Also, I learned about the barriers to making this a democratic election for the people. They say this is the most democratic election. But then we found out, for example, why voting can be so slow in Irian Jaya; elephants are participating in the election because they are carrying some of the election boxes.... So if the elephant is tired or something bad happens to it, the election box will be late.
- ✍ For me, the most important thing from the media polling training was how reporters can be researchers. We were taught about indicators, meaning indicators of news stories. It's a process of researching [what's behind a story]. We are supposed to be intellectual people, so we...need to do research to find out the facts. The polling training helped us learn about how to do research.
- ✍ For myself, I learned about the rules and regulations about the election mechanics. Then I also learned about the kinds of cheating that were ghosts from all the past elections that might disturb us now.... But it's not just for me, I can also give this knowledge [to the readers].
- ✍ We have provided products that are different from the Radio Republik Indonesia news broadcasts...and there has been a change so that more radio stations are making programming decisions...and they have more creativity and want a shorter radio program.
- ✍ Radio listeners like to listen to the news longer.
- ✍ Now listeners have the option of listening to news on sensitive topics
- ✍ In Aceh, news about conflict was missing from the papers. People value the radio news.
- ✍ As a result of these training programs, radio stations are talking and cooperating and sharing information.
- ✍ After the polling training, the participants went home to their newspapers with a new skill. They knew how to conduct a poll in their local media in order to measure the aspirations of the local people. For example, do the people in Irian Jaya want independence from Indonesia?
- ✍ The journalists can write better, and they have a better idea of what democracy is and how to investigate the government.
- ✍ I think the journalists [who attended the OTI-sponsored training] have a more professional attitude now.... Now they can give better information to the people, the readers. And they can give the important information to the readers, like about the issue of regional autonomy, and so forth.
- ✍ I think our training programs had a positive psychological effect on the participants.... I think the participants could feel proud because they had been trained according to U. S. standards for journalism.

✍ *Media: Lessons learned*

- ✍ OTI doesn't have a media advisor of high quality to match [Internews'] experience. I would recommend that there always be an experienced staffer to work with OTI's larger grantees.
- ✍ We wish that we had made a book for each of our training programs, so that people outside the training program could also learn. If we could make a book for every training program in the future, we will be more effective.... A popular book, not a report, that can be read by regular people or on a university campus.... Maybe people on a campus are confused about how to report on a conflict. Now in the book maybe there is an unusual article about the field experiences of our colleagues in Ternate and Ambon; this article was written by Mr. Thamrin from Universitas Indonesia, and then we try to find how to write about the situation. It explains why you shouldn't mention the number of victims.... If this could be a book, it would be most unusual. But the funding from OTI wasn't enough to publish a book.
- ✍ In media programs, don't underestimate the different areas that need help, such as government, academia, and the media itself. We should have included universities in the media training, so that new journalists coming through the schools would also benefit.... Maybe we could give manuals and

tapes to the universities to use.... We should give training straight to university professors of communications and journalism.

✍ But we learned that having a book isn't enough.

✍ We should have given more on-site training [to the radio stations because it is so successful].

Annex E: Condensed Transcript -- Programming Feedback

- ✍ *Grantees have poor understanding of OTI mandate*
- ✍ I don't really know what OTI's goal is. It is clear that they help with advocacy, like if people want to see changes, or if they want to have more self-confidence, and a lot of things.
- ✍ OTI speeds up a process.
- ✍ OTI's purpose is to give funding.
- ✍ What I know is just what I see from their programs.... [Does OTI have a goal that is different from other donors?] I think it is almost the same....
- ✍ But in democracy OTI is different...other donors have supported [our other activities]. But the majority of what OTI gave us was just for democracy, for voter education and civic education.
- ✍ I think OTI's purpose is to promote democracy and to fertilize everything, like education, political knowledge about rights and responsibilities, about the how to improve the environment.
- ✍ You can see from their name that...what is important [to OTI] is experiencing a transition period.
- ✍ In our experience, OTI has been more of a facilitator for responding to the process of transition in our own organization [because we have gotten involved in a new activity]. Imagine if we had protested and said "this is what we need" and then we met OTI and then they facilitated getting those things. But OTI is different. You see we have our ideas from below, from the grassroots level...and then we met OTI and then they facilitated us so we could do that program.... You see our activity is part of a long-term, five-year plan. It's just that the five months of activity could be handled by OTI. So we felt like we were facilitated a lot by them. It wasn't just the money, but there was a development in us as well.
- ✍ From the training programs that I attended and from what I understand, OTI facilitates programs that point towards democracy for the people during a transition time. And if we see from their name, "Transition", it does happen [their actions match their name].
- ✍ *OTI funding allowed for expansion of activities*
- ✍ OTI helped speed up our process of voter education. Our organization already had plans to do some voter education...but we cannot guess how far we would have gotten without OTI assistance.
- ✍ OTI was like a midwife helping our voter education efforts be born.... Having funding that was really focused on helping us in this transition time really helped.
- ✍ OTI was like our mother and our father because we didn't exist before we met them.
- ✍ I want to underline that OTI's help was very useful.... In eastern Indonesia, with the current economic conditions, don't expect that people will think about training programs; thinking about food is hard enough. Reporters of course have to be independent and smart. We hope that if there is additional funding, we want to have a plan to upgrade the reporters in Eastern Indonesia with OTI funding.... Without OTI funding, it would be so hard!
- ✍ We could have found some funding from a university, but we really wanted the extra contact and support [that OTI could provide].
- ✍ We always have to look to the future. But there was something [OTI funding] that allowed us to run faster.... With the funding from OTI, journalists from [Eastern Indonesia] were able to attend our training programs [on Java] and they talked a lot about their professional experiences. That was a very unusual experience, and was very *wajar* (appropriate). Think about the airplane cost of almost 4 million Rupiah to and from Irian Jaya; that [opportunity] almost couldn't happen if there weren't the funding from OTI.
- ✍ The problems in Indonesian society are complex...such as problems with access to family planning services.... As an association with a large membership, PUSKOWANJATI has to form partnerships with other organizations who have appropriate interests.... We have enough funding for our basic activity, which is lending money in our cooperatives.... So yes, we can survive without OTI, but programs outside our basic focus would take longer to happen.

- ✍ A lot of people say that an economic cooperative is pretty far from politics. PUSKOWANJATI itself is more of a grocery store, actually! At the same time, we were faced with the reality that political parties find ways [of pressuring our members to vote for them]. It is quite obvious that those things happen in the community. So we have to ask, what should PUSKOWANJATI do? With so many thousands of members [30,000], and such a high percent of our members wanted to know which political party PUSKOWANJATI was going to endorse, even though we never said anything political and we don't endorse anybody at all. But then again it wasn't right for us to allow that confusion to persist, without giving the right message. [We didn't feel it was right to allow our members to be in the dark about the political parties. In the two-day event, our members got to dialogue with the parties and to know what platforms or programs the parties said they would do for women if they won.] That's why we got the idea of sponsoring a dialogue among political parties. So that our members could hear what various parties could promise. To hold the parties accountable later, as compared to their campaign promises. PUSKOWANJATI never encouraged members to support particular parties...because that's not our purpose. Our purpose is about humanity...not about making a political machine....

✍ *Programming Decisions*

In general, grantees described OTI as a supportive donor who allows grantees enough freedom to develop appropriate programs. Some grantees, however, were disappointed that OTI did not support their long-term planning efforts and did not fund long-term activities.

- ✍ OTI does put enough resources into [developing] and idea.
- ✍ The good thing about OTI is that they don't try to teach us, meaning they don't try to dictate our programming.... What help we need, as long as it is related to making a positive change [in the community], they give. OTI offered us their five main themes, and told us to go ahead and make a proposal if we thought it could fit into one of the themes.
- ✍ We aren't free to choose our speakers. Maybe OTI is trying to judge the quality of the speaker with their standards, but we should also be able to judge who is appropriate for the event.
- ✍ It's like the effect of our programs evaporates.
- ✍ I really want an annual program, so that our preparation will be better and not *berburu* (so rushed).... We wouldn't need to have all the money dispersed at once, but planned for a year at a time.
- ✍ We want to offer a professional certificate for our proposed yearly program.... Every year the classification/specialization would change.
- ✍ We always asked OTI to support us for a longer-term plan. We said, "don't make it hit-and-run". We didn't think it was effective to wait until there was a problem and then give a training program. We don't know what we [as an organization] are going to be doing later. So we want a yearly program. We want to make a yearly training program for journalists, so that we can design a curriculum, and so we can have better results. The way it is right now, we wait until someone says, "hey, please make this kind of training," and then we make the program. We don't have a plan for the long term. So we suggested to OTI that we make a yearly program with six scheduled training sessions, with sessions such as conflict resolution, regional autonomy, and race relations. They agreed to the idea and asked us to make a plan but then.... In this way, we would have a better chance of reaching what the United States wants us to reach rather than just giving money away.... We want professionalism. We want it to be planned better. Imagine the impact if we could train some journalists in Eastern Indonesia in an organized way.
- ✍ We submitted the proposal two months before the election, maybe April or May. We didn't know how to do a budget. We worked it out with the staff of OTI.
- ✍ We experienced two different phases with OTI. It seemed to work better when OTI treated us like a group that had its own ideas, thoughts, and concepts and that OTI just had to add some support.... But we also experienced in the other way when OTI tried to over-direct us.

- ✍ But really, we weren't even looking for money. We didn't even mind if we didn't get *uang panitia* (organizing committee salaries). We had an idea that we wanted to see happen [and OTI helped the idea come to life].
 - ✍ We weren't intending to get a grant.... We didn't really know what freedom of the press meant. We didn't know how to cover an election either.... I told some people at OTI what I had in mind, and they told me that they liked my idea. We didn't even have an organization yet, not even a name.
 - ✍ OTI has experience in other countries, but sometimes they assumed they could just bring those ideas here without listening to local NGOs. For example, they gave us advice about the timing for broadcasting PSAs.... Eventually they felt their idea was better.
 - ✍ OTI helped us plan the program. You see, we didn't have a lot of experience in voter education. They listened to our ideas and helped us draft materials. We had intense discussions with them and they helped a lot, not just in terms of giving us funding. They also had some experience with elections in other countries that could help. They cared about increasing our knowledge. I think OTI should continue to give help like that, I mean beyond funding, when they give grants.
- ✍ *Programming: Grantees' methods for Measuring results and impacts*
- ✍ It's very interesting to hear [the beneficiaries] use their own language to talk about politics.
 - ✍ One week after the most recent training, each participating journalist had to send us a clipping of their work in their home paper.... Another time, we made a competition to see who could conduct an investigation with honesty...and we selected three winners who received an award directly from OTI....
 - ✍ We did testing pre and post for each PSA.... We always tested the concept.... For example, the original plan was for Pak Bendot [a character in one of the PSAs] was going to ride in a car, but people said they didn't have cars, so it was changed to riding a *bejaj* (motorized pedicab in Jakarta). Another example...Pak Garin [the producer] like to use a lot of symbols, but they were changed to be more realistic.

Annex F: Condensed Transcript -- Implementation Feedback

Conversations with grantees about the impact of OTI/Indonesia programs in FY1999 inevitably opened the door for comments on OTI's implementation approaches and policies. The surprise bonus of this impact assessment was the amount of feedback grantees gave about the implementation of OTI/Indonesia programs. Although this study did not attempt to balance grantee feedback with perspectives of OTI and its implementing organizations, one indication that the grantee feedback should be taken seriously is the consistency of the themes and issues raised. It should be noted, however, the purpose of this impact assessment was not to evaluate the substance or root of the implementation concerns; OTI should discuss this feedback with its implementing partners in order to assess the credibility of the concerns and to determine feasible alternatives and solutions.

✍ Communications with OTI

- ✍ [Before the proposal was approved] we talked to OTI 2-3 times a week, to find out what they wanted.
- ✍ We could talk to OTI people any time of day.
- ✍ I think OTI only came once to our events. A lot of the events were outside Java so they didn't attend.
- ✍ Whenever we needed to talk to OTI, there was no problem in contacting them. We never had any difficulties in getting the grant approved, disbursing funds, or other communications. But we heard that some other grantees in town had some communication problems. There was a perception that one of the OTI staff "backed up" certain grantees too much.

✍ Feedback about proposal and approval process

In general, grantees appreciated the speed with which OTI processed and approved grant proposals. A few grantees interviewed for this research expressed a wish that OTI/Indonesia would be more "selective" in choosing grantees.

- ✍ Usually we suggest a proposal and spend a long time discussing the proposal with OTI and revising it. Sometimes more than a month. Then the approval *mendadak* (comes very suddenly), very close to our proposed start date.
- ✍ When OTI approves a grant, it shouldn't be too *mepet* (close) to the start date of the activity. For example, maybe the event is supposed to be on the 10th of the month. OTI finally approves the activity on the 5th or 6th. But we still have to run around and find the speakers, the participants, and the meeting place. Of course we wouldn't start contacting the speakers, hotel, etc., if we didn't have approval from OTI. But as soon as we get their approval, there is very little time left. And sometimes we have to change the date if the speakers aren't available.
- ✍ It was difficult when we had to make the proposal and budget description. Maybe they could offer an example of what they want the budget to look like.
- ✍ I wish OTI were more selective in choosing their grantees, so that they would know that the money they were giving was going to be more effective. For example, what if they asked a perspective grantee to make a short oral presentation about their idea and have to answer some questions. Then it would be clearer that the proposal was approved because it was of good quality that could be held responsible, not because the grantee was a friend of someone on the OTI staff.
- ✍ For example, I once heard of a perspective grantee that claimed they had conducted some primary research [about a certain topic]. But then I found out that the grantee staff had just pulled the research from the newspaper.... OTI shouldn't be *dibohongin* (lied to) if they are a professional organization.
- ✍ I know of an instance when an OTI-sponsored seminar was a sham.... Someone on our staff went to the event and found out that there was nothing besides reading what was in the newspaper...it was a very low-quality program. I imagine that OTI money could have been used on more important things.... Why didn't OTI monitor the event?

✍ *Grantees perceive that grants cannot be amended*

- ✍ The schedule in the proposal doesn't always match the availability of the speakers. We try to get the speaker for a certain day, but we can't guarantee that we will get the speaker for that day. OTI needs to understand that the reality of hunting for people in the field is more difficult than what we had written in the proposal. These are small problems with OTI, but they can disturb our long-term relationship with our speakers.

✍ *Confusion about setting prices for goods*

- ✍ The in-kind mechanism made life difficult for us when we had many events happening in the same month. For example, we needed to have a lot of blank notebooks for our participants. According to the rules, DAI needed to buy the notebooks for us.... Then we came to a decision with DAI that they would give us a down payment for the notebooks. And we still had to debate about the price of the notebooks.
- ✍ It's funny if we are paid to stay in a hotel but then they don't want to pay for us to have dinner while we are there.
- ✍ It's like they always have standards, and [even though] we try to provide comparisons, and they don't want to understand.
- ✍ Maybe they should have ranges instead of fixed prices; we don't know either where the standard prices came from.
- ✍ I don't know what to do with tips and other miscellaneous expenses; I think they said we couldn't claim those expenses...I don't know, maybe it's just a communication problem.
- ✍ DAI shouldn't assume that the prices for hotels depend on the size of the city; they shouldn't assume that *Wilayah Dati II* is cheaper than *Wilayah Dati I*. For example, we had a hotel in Ujung Pandang that was a lot cheaper than the hotel in Kendari, [and DAI assumed that the price would be lower in Kendari]. I wish they would go research on their own if they don't trust us. If it was just one activity, okay...we don't mind consulting them. But if there are a lot of events, these technical problems with DAI are a big problem.
- ✍ They can't assume that prices are predictable outside of Java. They don't seem to really understand.
- ✍ There is the rule about having three price quotations, but the three hotels, for examples, might be different quality.
- ✍ Or printers, what if the different prices are different quality? We once took a risk of paying for the right printer with our own program money and then waiting for OTI to pay us back. We said that if they reimbursed us, fine, and if they didn't fine. Eventually, after a long while, they reimbursed us.
- ✍ There was once a problem with procurement in DAI themselves. How do we know if DAI uses money right or not? Once they were supposed to buy [something] with a certain price. We checked later and the store said it was actually 25 thousand Rupiah less.... They did get the discount...but then the lower price didn't show up in our grant reports.... So where did the extra money go? ...That was just one item; imagine if that's been happening with many items!
- ✍ There was a case when the additional expenses we incurred in the field, which were only 100 thousand Rupiah, were reported as being 200 thousand Rupiah by OTI. So which number am I supposed to put in my report to OTI? Yes, the good thing with in-kind is that we don't have to worry too much about it... But sometimes we want to check if actual expenses is being written down correctly.
- ✍ One of my friends who was also a grantee told me a story.... DAI wanted to negotiate the price of the hotel. My friend checked the price with the hotel and found out that there was a discount, but the discount wasn't mentioned in the report.
- ✍ We've had to use our money up front a lot and wait to be reimbursed.
- ✍ We had a problem with airplane tickets in the field. We had already bought the round trip ticket...and you know that flights outside of Java aren't every day. So we changed the schedule back one day to accommodate the airplane schedule.... [But then going home we had to take a different

carrier because the airplane companies alternate days to that city.] They didn't really understand, and they didn't want to pay for the ticket and eventually we had to pay for the ticket by ourselves.... If we left on a Merpati flight today, and tomorrow we come home on a Bouraq flight [because that's all that was available on that day], they don't want to hear about it....

- ✍ Some of these small problems are out of our control.
- ✍ We are surprised that the Indonesian staff at DAI/OTI don't understand.
- ✍ Since we have experience with finance [and DAI doesn't]...there are many small problems for us.

✍ *Confusion about setting speakers' fees*

- ✍ If we get a really good speaker at the last minute, who can't be paid a low price, we are in a difficult situation.... This happened to us, but it wasn't a barrier because luckily we were able to negotiate a lower price....
- ✍ We also had a problem with setting the speaker's fee. Sometimes OTI wants to use their standard price, but sometimes the proposed speaker has a different price outside of OTI. Sometimes the OTI price is too high and sometimes too low. For example, maybe the speaker agrees to come to the event and be paid 1 million Rupiah. But then OTI says, "no, you can only pay them 750 thousand Rupiah." We're the ones who actually pay the speaker, and all the speaker knows is that they are getting paid by us, the grantee. OTI isn't directly visible. What happens if we pay them the low price this time but then we want to invite them again some time in the future? What if the speaker doesn't want to come? Then we would be in a difficult situation.
- ✍ But there are problems about the speakers. Sometimes there is a change, an increase, in the number of speakers needed [after the grant is approved]...[and we don't know how to arrange the speaker's fees].... We anticipate that there would be a problem if one speaker who was getting paid 750 thousand Rupiah found out that another speaker was getting paid 1 million Rupiah.... They would think that we [the grantee] were corrupt.... We wish OTI were more flexible.
- ✍ Maybe OTI tries to generalize too much about the prices for speakers.... Or, they assume that the prices in [the suburbs around Jakarta] are lower than the prices in Jakarta.

✍ *Pros and cons of in-kind procurement mechanism*

- ✍ Make the rest of USAID operate more like OTI, in terms of administration. Oh, but I understand there are different mandates and rules about operating in a crisis....
- ✍ OTI is fast.
- ✍ We already had an organized accounting system, so it was easy [to work with DAI].
- ✍ They gave us a [bookkeeping] system to follow, but we already had a better system!
- ✍ Maybe DAI should consider using the systems we, a grantee, already had set up to send payments to the NGOs who were the sub-grantees. We already have experience sending money to [the sub-grantees] routinely.
- ✍ Their counting of everything...showed that they were too scared of *penyelewengan* (abuse of funds).
- ✍ All these in-kind rules should be to guard against us misusing funds.... But they should see which NGOs can be trusted and which cannot.... I think it's good, but not for all items and not for all NGOs.
- ✍ If I could make a suggestion, they should trust us all the way or not at all—don't trust us half way! If OTI doesn't trust us, someone from OTI should come themselves to the event and hand deliver the money and directly pay the speakers etc. OTI rarely comes to our events now. Go ahead and see for yourself if we are being responsible. Right now the money problem is like playing ping-pong!
- ✍ Don't say up front that you don't trust us; it would be okay to say that at the end [if we disappointed you].
- ✍ The in-kind system is *kaku* (awkward). But I like the in-kind system because we have to keep receipts. If we are a good organization, then that shouldn't be a problem for us at all. Maybe for other NGOs it is a problem.

- ✍ I like the in-kind mechanism because we aren't kept busy by having to track all the expenses. It means that OTI has selected us because we really care about our program and we really want to run our program [not because we necessarily can keep track of expenses].
- ✍ They didn't appreciate the intellectual value of our work.... If we made a syllabus...usually other Indonesians will appreciate our work...with a little bit of money.
- ✍ I would recommend that they keep using the in-kind mechanism but with more smoothness and more on time.
- ✍ I would suggest that OTI doesn't use the in-kind mechanism. I would suggest that OTI transfers money in the full amount of the approved grant proposal to the grantee's account. Then the grantee allocates the money according to the schedule in the grant proposal.
- ✍ [Was the in-kind mechanism and logic explained ahead of time?] Yes, but it is too difficult.
- ✍ It's good that we had sub-grants with our member NGOs [instead of the grantee disbursing the funds to the participating groups].... Our friends in the *daerah* (other regions) got the experience of negotiating the contract with DAI...it helped them learn new skills and new responsibility for money...it was a good kind of decentralization.
- ✍ [It was good that our organization] was treated more like a vendor with OTI. We had to turn in all our receipts, and we already had an accounting system and all we had to do was change the format to match what OTI wanted.
- ✍ It would be nice if we had the money up front and then we could provide a receipt signed by the speaker afterwards.
- ✍ OTI should just give the money to the grantee and hold the grantee responsible.
- ✍ They should allow grantees to develop the skills of getting quotations for hotels and keeping receipts. I think it would be very easy just to say that you won't reimburse for anything without the receipt.
- ✍ Maybe DAI/OTI can write down the rules and distribute them...some kind of financial guidance that fits on two pages.... Then we just have to follow the rules.
- ✍ Having an in-kind mechanism causes a bad image in the eyes of some NGOs.
- ✍ Provide more training for grantees and sub-grantees on financial record keeping.

✍ *Late payments were a problem*

Grantees expressed concern about the timing of payments to vendors and speakers. Some grantees were unhappy with the reasons why payments were late (perceived reasons were that the OTI rules were too difficult, or that the OTI implementation staff could not keep up with the workload of payments needed in a short period of time). All grantees were interested in protecting their image with vendors and speakers and were concerned that late or impartial payments made the grantee--not OTI--lose face.

- ✍ If OTI has to use the "in-kind" mechanism, then OTI needs to disburse the money *tepatilah waktu* (more on time), just like we *menempati jam* (follow the schedule) for our event.
- ✍ If OTI uses the "in-kind" mechanism, it's not a problem as long as the payments happen on time. If the money doesn't come on time, we look really bad in the eyes of the guest speaker.
- ✍ One weakness of OTI is that they don't trust us in the area of money, and we don't really know what their considerations are, and this has inconvenienced us quite a bit. They challenge us to have a really good program that runs on time. On the financial side we have had many troubles. For example, we had to pay a fee to the speakers for our program. But on the day we had to pay the speakers [the day of the event], we didn't have the cash yet from OTI. Crazy! Where was I supposed to find the money? We were so stressed out.
- ✍ [Why wasn't the money transferred on time?] We know that the memo of understanding (MOU) says that the details about the place, location, and syllabus had to have been given to OTI. But two days before the event, we were still busy faxing them telling them who exactly would speak. And then the administrative section of OTI used that as an excuse so that they didn't have to send us the money on time. It took two or three weeks for us to get the money and then pay our speaker.

- ✍ And sometimes it's ridiculous. Once we had to pay the radio station ahead of time with our own funds because there was no OTI money. We all had to wait for the OTI money to arrive at the radio station. When the money arrived, then the radio station had to send the OTI money back to us, the grantee! So the money is just going in circles!
- ✍ None of the payments [to our vendor] arrived on time when they were needed.... It was very complicated because DAI would send them money and we would send them money, and then when the money from DAI finally arrived, it had to get reimbursed to us!
- ✍ The money came long after the program was finished.
- ✍ We were disappointed because our speaker was very busy and had to arrange time off from work and then had to get a [train/plane/bus] ticket to come to our location. That already is difficult. Then suddenly we found out that OTI wanted to buy the ticket directly for the speaker. But the speaker already had a ticket! When we complained to OTI, they just repeated the information in the MOU about sending the information a week ahead of time. But how can we comply if we are still settling the speakers a few days ahead of time? Our time is so limited. A program that should take three months to organize, OTI has us organize in only one month. There just isn't enough time.
- ✍ Sometimes we have to pay the speaker's fee using a little bit of the *panitia* (organizing committee's) salary [because the OTI money hasn't been sent yet].
- ✍ If we don't pay the speaker [on the day of the event], the speaker doesn't trust us. Maybe they won't want to work with us again. But where am I supposed to get the money? This happened often.
- ✍ Also, we need to pay for supplies before the event. [The fact that OTI doesn't pay on time] would be a big problem for an organization that doesn't have a lot of money [because they would have to use their own money first]. But OTI learned and they provided the supplies on time the next time.
- ✍ When we had another event, we had to pay transportation money for the participants. Some of them traveled very far for the event.... But on the day of the event, there was no money because the money hadn't been transferred yet to our bank account. So where were we supposed to find the money? We ended up splitting it among us, the program organizers. But then we had to argue about whether we should split it evenly or if anyone could pay a little extra up front. It was crazy.
- ✍ One of the weaknesses of OTI, I don't know if it is OTI or DAI. Sometimes we had a lot of activities happening at the same time, and all the money was being handled by DAI. It could have been on time, but because the money didn't come on time to the field, it disturbed our program. Then we, the grantee, had to pay up front, and sometimes we used our personally money.
- ✍ I have a suggestion about the mechanics of sending money. DAI was using an international bank. Our partners were NGOs who had accounts with Bank Rakyat Indonesia, and their accounts were actually at the unit level [at small branches that take along time to receive funds from the central BRI offices and that are a long distance from any international bank]. It seems that DAI needs to open a bank account at BRI to make this easier.
- ✍ Actually, we didn't have any difficulty really, but DAI had a lot of difficulty managing the *lalu lintas* (traffic) of money going back and forth [in the few months before the election].
- ✍ All the money problems *pakai berantam dulu* (had to be argued about before they could be settled).
- ✍ *Perception that implementation approach disturbed existing relationships*
- ✍ For example, we had an arrangement with a television station...which had a policy of giving the reporters who covered the story some lunch money.... And the price we had with the television station included all these fees. You see, that is their own management style. OTI agreed, but with their own rules--they actually wanted to call each of the reporters one by one...and pay them the lunch money.... It was very embarrassing.... They need to accommodate. Actually OTI's idea was very good, but you can't force it [the management style]. People were *tersinggung* (insulted).... And they [the television] thought that it was our [the grantee] style.
- ✍ At another event we held, the radio station hosting us was only paid half, and if I'm not mistaken it took another month for the rest of the money to come. It even got to the point that someone from the

radio station gave me a message saying “hey, don’t be late, please pay quickly if you can.” I was so surprised, because I didn’t even know that he hadn’t been paid yet.

✍ *Other perceived weaknesses in implementation*

- ✍ Look at more conservative exchange rates when estimating the budgets for projects, especially in times of economic transition when exchange rates are likely to be volatile.
- ✍ Sometimes they don’t see the behavior of an organization. For example, what if their policy says that the books have to be black. But the grantee usually has blue books. They should be able to compromise and mix the black and the blue books. But they don’t want to, or if they do, it takes a lot of time.
- ✍ In a short program, they have to review our records [like our materials for the event] so quickly before they can send the money.
- ✍ They said they wanted to review all our materials but then they didn’t have staff that had the time to review it all.
- ✍ Everything happened *mendadak* (in a rush).
- ✍ The voter education program *mendadak* (was rushed) because we just were introduced to OTI in January 1999. We actually had the idea for the program a long time before. The deal with OTI was finalized in February, and then the deal with DAI in March. So we just started in March....
- ✍ DAI wanted everything done as economically and as fast as possible ..., but DAI didn’t *ngobrol dulu* (ask us first) about how we would recommend doing the logistics. We have the experience in these technical problems. They just went ahead and did things.
- ✍ [So what are your secrets for how to deal with DAI/OTI?] According to my experience, everything had to be argued about first.... We had to argue and say “if you do it that way, it won’t work...we’ve always done it this way....” And I say that if they want it that way then please they can do it themselves, but that if I do it it’s going to be handled this way.
- ✍ We found out that sometimes we had to bypass DAI and get OTI staff involved to solve some of these technical/money problems.
- ✍ We have studied a lot from OTI, but they still have administrative problems.
- ✍ We don’t know if the problems are in DAI or in OTI.

✍ *Grantees’ perceptions about other donors*

- ✍ We found out in the field that there had already been a similar training program. We ended up using the same facilitators for the event. Usually this kind of overlap is complimentary, but there should be greater coordination among donors. Maybe they should exchange publications.
- ✍ Maybe because we feel comfortable with OTI, with their system and their way of thinking and providing us support...we don’t feel we need to find funding from another donor. We don’t have any difficulty in designing programs with them. If the OTI office is going to close some day, we would like to ask their help in putting us in touch with other donors. If we have to start over from scratch, it will be very hard for us to convince [donors who don’t know anything about us].... Our programs would be disturbed.
- ✍ We have also had some help from CPT, and we prefer it. Why? Because of the expectations. From the beginning, before the program has started, we talk about the program. And after the program is approved, we put in a budget and that’s where we really have to negotiate very carefully, asking “is that really the price?” And the negotiator from that side [CPT] has experience [with the prices] and so they understand. So sometimes they ask, “isn’t the price usually about this much, and why do have that much?” It’s not a problem. So we feel comfortable because we know that we’re not being *diragui* (mistrusted) but maybe we had gotten prices from the wrong vendor. So then we want to know where the low prices are, and the good quality. From the beginning it’s clear, and so by the end [of the event] the expectations are clearer about how much money we should be spending.... And then we don’t have to argue about it again.

- ✍ When we told CPT that our bookkeeping was a mess, CPT immediately sent us an accountant to help set up our books, not just for the CPT program but for all our activities. [This was in contrast to what we experienced with OTI.]